

Nationalism and Foreign Policy: Does Internal Equality Reduce External Conflict?¹

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Abstract

When do strong national identities lead to external conflict, and can they ever encourage cooperation? Some political scientists note the virtues of nationalism for uniting groups within a state and encouraging loyalty. Others fear nationalism's darker side: intense national pride drives hawkishness and nationalism has been implicated in conflicts from WWI to Russia's recent incursions in Ukraine (Schrock-Jacobson, 2012). I argue that nationalism as a cause of hawkish foreign policy preferences depends on a singular understanding of national identity — one based on community — where maintaining the group's unity requires a separation between “us” and “them.” However, equality can also shape social relations — and it generates a conceptually and practically distinct group identity. The results of a survey experiment show that nationalism relates to hawkishness only when people conceive of their co-nationals as part of a community group. Community-based nationalists are less cooperative and more bellicose, but the opposite holds when equality provides the basis for the national identity. In that condition, strong identifiers are less conflictual in response to an escalating foreign policy crisis, and more willing to cooperate internationally. These findings provide an alternative way of understanding the trade-off between nationalism as a force for peace within states but war between states. The effect of nationalism depends on how individuals' understand the nature of the identity.

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The dark side of a strong national identity might... be a greater predisposition to conflict with other nations. - Sambanis and Shayo (2013, 320)

Introduction

Do strong national identities lead to external conflict, or can nationalism be a source of international cooperation? Some IR scholars investigate the domestic sources of foreign policy behavior and argue that public opinion, for example, can lead to conflict when nationalist fervor demands action (Mansfield and Snyder, 1995). They posit a relationship between identity politics within states and how the state interacts with outside actors: nationalism causes international war (Mercer, 1995; Schrock-Jacobson, 2012; Mearsheimer, 2014). When it is “us” versus “them,” militarism and warmongering may result (Van Evera, 1994; Mansfield and Snyder, 2002; Penn, 2008; Bertoli, 2014).

Such conflictual outcomes challenge long-standing ideas about the benefits of nationalism for bringing groups together within states (Kymlicka, 1998; Sambanis and Shayo, 2013). Emerson (1960, 384) illustrates the competing incentives with what he calls the “fundamental dilemma” of nation-building, which provides “no hope of escape within its own terms since the counterpart of the unity of the nation’s ‘we’ is the deep gulf of separation from the ‘they’ of other peoples...: It has been wisely said that the price of nationality is war.” Drawing new boundaries to bring diverse groups together as a single community encourages solidarity within the group, but at the same time establishes an outgroup that can become a new target for aggression and militaristic foreign policy in conditions favorable to competition. Intense national pride poses a risk to international peace, as in the Yugoslav conflict in the early 1990s or Hitler’s quest for German superiority (Van Evera, 1994), at the same time that it ostensibly promotes domestic harmony. Emerson (1960, 385) concludes with what has become the conventional wisdom — that the benefits outweigh the risks, “unless preferable forms of community which people were prepared to accept were ready at hand.”

I introduce a novel theory that probes the connection between national identity and international conflict by investigating the social relations that constitute what it means to be part of a national identity group. Emerson (1960) accepted a trade-off between national pride and foreign policy bellicosity — something conceivably to be resolved through an altogether distinct structure

for the international system but that was likely to persist. I argue that the relationship between the strength of identity at the state level and conflict or cooperation at the international level depends on the relational norms that underlie individuals' social identity. The structure of relations and interactions among co-nationals can alter the way that individuals respond to outgroups in the realm of foreign policy. Whereas [Spinner-Halev and Theiss-Morse \(2003\)](#) express concern about the dangers of strong nationalism, [Mansfield and Snyder \(2002\)](#) see the mobilization of national identities as a key causal mechanism for democratizing states' paths to external war, and [Mearsheimer \(2014\)](#) warns of the dangers of Chinese "hypernationalism," I contend that these observations are based on a singular, community-based understanding of social identity — one that I challenge by introducing political scientists to the relational models framework.

Relational models theory explains that distinct structures shape how people relate to each other, and that each structure constitutes an alternative type of social identity ([Fiske, 1991](#)). Communal Sharing relations correspond to the type of unified group with a common history, language, and/or values which permeates political science research on national identities. In contrast, Equality Matching relations — marked by peer-style interactions among individuals who see themselves as one of a set of equals — offer another possible basis for what constitutes a social identity ([Fiske, 1992](#)). Both types of social relations exist across different domains in global societies, such that Communal Sharing groups do not predominate the international system ([Fiske, 2004](#)).

Since the content of social identity can vary ([Abdelal et al., 2006](#)), and it does not have a fixed basis in community relations, I theorize a contingent relationship between a strong national identification and conflictual foreign policy. Conflictual foreign policy preferences do not emerge automatically from nationalism, but from nationalism rooted in community relations. Equality Matching relations can ameliorate the negative effects attributed to nationalism while encouraging international cooperation.

In the next section, I discuss the problem at the core of this paper in more detail — the oft-observed connection between nationalism and conflictual foreign policy. Next, I present my novel theory by connecting social relations to social identity content and discussing the implications for research on nationalism and foreign policy attitudes. Next, I derive a set of specific hypotheses from my theory. I test my hypotheses with a novel experiment that manipulates the relational models directly. I create a fictional state and establish what it means to identify it — which relational

norms structure interactions across the country and determine the identity content. I then assess the strength of their newly established national identity and measure responses to a fictional foreign policy crisis to determine when nationalism predicts conflictual or cooperative foreign policy preferences.

The experiment produces two important results. First, I find that high levels of national chauvinism predict hawkish responses to an escalating foreign policy crisis, but that this relationship is moderated by relational norms: Equality Matching attenuates the positive association between strong national identification and hostility. Second, I also measure the impact of the relational structures on more abstract preferences for militant and cooperative internationalism, and find evidence of a key interaction between national attachment and cooperative internationalism. Those most attached to a nation dominated by Equality Matching relations favor external cooperation — a positive relationship that does not exist when Communal Sharing relations prevail. These interactions contradict much of the accepted wisdom in literature on foreign policy and public opinion, and show that the relational approach to identity matters. I find support for my hypotheses in a difficult experimental environment, where the relational approach to a novel identity is constructed on the fly rather than deeply ingrained by an extended socialization process. I conclude by discussing implications for foreign policy public opinion, IR scholars, and political psychologists while pointing to directions for future work.

2 Building Nationalism: Costs and Benefits in International Politics

Scholars in the liberal nationalist tradition favor an international system where national identities have coalesced within each state. They accentuate the positive side of communities and envision national identity as a “social glue, one which is potentially inclusive and capable of binding people otherwise divided by economic and ethnic differences into a sharing community” within a state’s territorial boundaries (Johnston et al., 2010, 350, Kymlicka, 1998). Group solidarity built on a foundation of a shared community identity will produce positive, cooperative behavior within the boundaries of a common group — whether due to a sense of trust, loyalty or another mechanism strengthened by shared identification — according to this argument (Miller, 1995; Johnston et al., 2010). These insights are consistent with a host of evidence from psychology’s Social Identity

Theory (SIT).

Familiar to many political scientists, SIT explains that individuals derive an important component of their identity from their group memberships, and that they have a robust positive bias in favor of fellow group members (Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel and Turner, 1986; Brown, 2000). Even absent pre-existing ties to members of a group created in the lab based on otherwise innocuous characteristics — the so-called “minimal group paradigm” (Tajfel and Turner, 1979)³ — individuals favor those with whom they share an identity. People express their favoritism toward ingroup members with high trustworthiness ratings (Brown, 2000), generous rewards (Tajfel and Turner, 1979), willingness to cooperate over the use of shared resources, and forgiveness for transgressions (Gaertner and Dovidio, 2000). In short, research demonstrates a substantial amount of “ingroup love” when a common social identity binds people together (Brewer, 1999).

This drive for positive group identity arises independently of “outgroup hate,” but can precipitate hostility toward outsiders — social identities and “ingroup attachment lay the groundwork for intergroup conflict” under certain conditions (Brewer, 2001, 28). The willingness to help and cooperate with group members does not extend toward outgroups, which can come at an indirect cost to “others” outside of the identity group (Brewer, 2001). More pernicious and direct consequences occur when groups differ in status or are otherwise competitive, or are political entities (Brewer, 2001). Direct outgroup antagonism might occur in response to a threat from a segment of an outside group or when states are engaged in a conflict over prized territory (Gibler, Hutchison and Miller, 2012). Strong identities can breed negative stereotypes, antagonism, violence under the right circumstances (Branscombe and Wann, 1994; Brewer, 1999; Monroe, 2008).

Social identities are not fixed, a factor that inspires scholars from across international relations and comparative politics to assert that building or solidifying a robust national identity offers a key path to cooperation in diverse states.⁴ Whether an existing social category guides individual behavior or otherwise holds a place of importance depends on contextual salience, and new identities can develop as social groups shift or emerge (Turner, 1985; Hogg, 2008; Gaertner et al., 1989). When

³For example, participants might be shown a random array of dots on a screen and asked to quickly guess how many dots are displayed. They are then categorized as being an “over-estimator” or an “under-estimator,” and grouped with individuals who are said to share the same bias. In reality, they are randomly assigned to groups, in a process unrelated to their guess. The characteristic that binds the groups is thus both insignificant and random.

⁴The notion of building a common identity has also been applied to improving relations between states as in the case of regional identities (Herrmann and Brewer, 2004), security communities (Deutsch, 1961; Acharya, 2001), or the potential for a world state (Wendt, 2003).

various identity groups within a state have been hardened against one another by a history of tribalism, racism, inequality, civil war, etc., theory and practice alike call for a strong national identity that encompasses each subgroup (Emerson, 1960; Sambanis and Shayo, 2013; Weinbaum, 2006). Building a national identity might mimic Atatürk's imposition of the common Turkish language to develop national pride in Turkey or Weinbaum's (2006, 127) call for the "reviv[al] and strengthening of constructive national myths" in Afghanistan, but whatever the route to achieving it, the conventional wisdom favors common identity groups that bind peoples into a cooperative whole. Positive ingroup biases and the cognitive flexibility of social identity encourage the liberal nationalist position in favor of an international system where national identities have coalesced within each state.

Critics express concern, however, that encouraging national identification resolves one problem while creating another — the "fundamental dilemma" introduced by Emerson (1960). Outgroup hostility does not simply disappear when subgroups unite. The process recasts relevant boundaries, as defining a national ingroup is necessarily exclusive. When individuals shift the focus of their positive discrimination to co-nationals rather than co-ethnics, the potential for outgroup bias then redirects to "others" who reside outside of the state. This explains patterns observed in salient contemporary examples — while citizens across racial, class, and ideological lines might have supported one another as Americans in the aftermath of 9/11, the identification of al Qaeda as the organization behind the attacks defined people of the Muslim world as members of a relevant and threatening outgroup.

The boundary between a national ingroup and an external actor becomes increasingly meaningful when nationalism predominates, which sets the stage for outgroup antagonism. As Cottam and Cottam (2001, 93) write in regard to solidifying national differences: "frequently, this results in ethnocentrism. These patterns can be expected among nationalistic people since, by definition, the nation as a group receives primary and terminal loyalty." In other words, if people from various groups within a state identify with the nation — such that it overtakes their ethnic or other subgroup identity — they begin to see their nation as superior to relevant comparison groups like neighboring states or international rivals. "Nationalism's propagation can only succeed if there is a clear delineation of the 'other,'" a process that promotes conflict (Schrock-Jacobson, 2012, 829). The Soviet Union represented a diverse community, but defined itself in part by its contrast with

rivals in the West.

Nationalism connects strong in-group identification to “authoritarianism, intolerance, and war-mongering” (Li and Brewer, 2004, 728), which can encourage international competition or war. Schrock-Jacobson (2012) shows that the presence of nationalism within a state predicts a higher probability of Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) initiation, while (Bertoli, 2014) leverages a regression discontinuity design to show a causal relationship between nationalist surges during the soccer World Cup and interstate aggression. States might use force as they seek to assert the primacy of their community to challengers, or as in the recent Russian incursion in Ukraine, force can be employed to bring co-nationals into an existing community.⁵

Distinguishing between nationalism and patriotism or attachment, scholars find that the former, which implies a sense of ingroup superiority, predicts a host of hawkish foreign policy preferences and negative outgroup attitudes, consistent with the expectations of conventional social identity accounts (De Figueiredo and Elkins, 2003; Kemmelmeier and Winter, 2008; Federico, Golec and Dial, 2005). Spinner-Halev and Theiss-Morse (2003) criticize the liberal nationalist tradition and write that too much national egoism prompts interstate conflict, in line with Mercer’s (1995) argument that states’ drives to maintain positive social identities allow international war to persist. In their early investigations into the structure of foreign policy attitudes, Hurwitz and Pef-fley (1987) find evidence that a similar construct, ethnocentrism, predicts militarism, staunch anti-communism, and a stronger belief in the morality of warfare among Americans; in 1990, they further conclude that patriotism drives people to advocate more “hard-line” policies toward the Soviet Union. Later, Herrmann, Isernia and Segatti (2009) test a new conceptualization of national identity in American and Italian samples, to determine the connection between each component of identity and attitudes in international politics. They confirm that certain types of nationalism, those that stress superiority and cultural homogeneity, indeed predict both dispositional militarism and conflictual responses to foreign policy issues. These findings are consistent with social psychological distinctions between patriotism as a non-competitive group attachment – simple “ingroup love” – and nationalism, wherein the sense of competition toward outsiders is salient (Brewer, 1999; Li and Brewer, 2004).

Outside research on mass opinion or case studies of particular wars, more recent quantitative

⁵See Van Evera, 1994 for a broader discussion of nationalism and war.

scholarship demonstrates a connection between nationalism and conflict across time and space. [Schrock-Jacobson \(2012\)](#) shows that the presence of nationalism within a state is associated with a higher probability of Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) initiation, while [Bertoli, 2014](#)) leverages a regression discontinuity design to show a causal relationship between nationalist surges following participation in the soccer World Cup and interstate aggression. Nationalism thus appears to connect not only to mass preferences for conflict, but also to actual interstate war.

2.1 Overcoming the “Fundamental Dilemma”

Evidence thus supports the observation from [Emerson \(1960\)](#) that [Sambanis and Shayo \(2013, 320\)](#) reiterate many years later: national identities, while beneficial for establishing solidarity among diverse groups within territorial boundaries, have a militant dark side. Proposed solutions to this dilemma typically work within the existing framework of social identity theory to suggest that creating ever-larger ingroups which ultimately “encompass all humanity” could pave the path toward peace ([Mercer, 1995, 250](#), [Wendt, 2003](#)).

Yet, broadly inclusive identities are relatively unstable because individuals strive for “optimal distinctiveness” – meaning that they seek both closeness to group members and differentiation or individuality ([Brewer, 1999](#)). Switching to such a universal identity group can also trigger stronger, rather than weaker biases, if the national identity is perceived to be threatened or associated with an exclusive prototype ([Brewer, 1999](#); [Waldzus, Mummendey and Wenzel, 2005](#)). Moreover, while it may seem feasible in the lab, “When the groups concerned are real-life entities, such a strategy may be psychologically and practically harder to implement” ([Brown, 2000, 752](#)). Imagine in the short term that Israelis and Palestinians are asked to redefine themselves as part of the same, over-arching social identity community — the practical barriers become evident.

Scholarship that finds nationalism and international cooperation to be countervailing forces — and political science research that engages the concept of social identity more generally — relies on a singular concept of social identity groups: as *communities*. Communities imply a sense of unity — a “we-ness” that entails a belief in shared destiny and real or imagined common values, history, or other common bond – and that has been incorporated directly into prominent definitions of the nation ([Cottam and Cottam, 2001](#); [Anderson, 1991](#); [Emerson, 1960](#)). However, social cognition research demonstrates that the expression of social identity varies depending on the social relations

that shape interactions among individuals, in its content and the implications for behavior toward ingroup and outgroup members. Relational models theory offers a framework for understanding the structure of social interactions, and how four distinct structures give rise to alternate bases for social identity (Fiske, 1991). Using this framework I argue that relations of *equality* can produce national-level social identities that lead to international cooperation rather than conflict.

While SIT has become pervasive in political science — with reviews, applications, and extensions appearing in top journals from the *American Journal of Political Science* (Transue, 2007) to *International Organization* (Mercer, 1995) and *Political Psychology* (Huddy, 2001) — relational models theory has been relatively unknown to political scientists outside of Fiske and Tetlock's (1997) *Political Psychology* piece on taboo trade-offs. Yet the framework maintains widespread recognition across subfields of psychology (Haslam, 2004; Rai and Fiske, 2011; Vodosek, 2009), business (Blois and Ryan, 2012), marketing (Sheppard and Tuchinsky, 1996), and anthropology (Nettle et al., 2011), with recent applications to political ideology (Simpson and Laham, 2014) (albeit in a psychology journal).

Succinctly stated, relational models theory tells us that “People relate to each other in just four ways” (Fiske, 2004, 3). All social relations that individuals have with one another are generated and structured according to one of these fundamental forms that have been identified through extensive ethnographic, theoretical, and experimental research (Fiske, 1991, 1992; Haslam, 2004). The models are discrete structures. They do not exist on a continuum but are separate, unipolar factors — though they can interact with one another to produce complex structures (Haslam and Fiske, 1999; Fiske, 2004).

Relational models serve as “the schemata people use to construct and construe relationships,” shaping acceptable and expected behavior as well as perceptions of others' actions (Fiske, 1992, 689). They each manifest themselves in diverse and politically important domains such as exchange, work, orientations toward land, decision-making, social identity, moral judgment, and aggression — and these represent only half of the categories listed by Fiske (1991, 42-49). Not only do the relational models apply to dyadic relationships, but they also “give form to collectivities” and “provide the basis for a distinct kind of identity or self for group members,” making them an appropriate place to turn for investigations into the constitution of national identity groups the international effects of nationalism (Fiske, 1991, 82). I focus here on two relational models, Communal Sharing and

Equality Matching, and outline the structures as well as the types of identities constituted by each.

First, Communal Sharing (CS) structures imply complete equality, such that no one person is valued above another, and actions to service the betterment of the group – not necessarily of the individual – are common and expected. This equality and value for others is powerful but extends only to the boundaries imposed by the group's identity:

What is salient is the superordinate group as such, membership in it, and the boundaries with contrasting outsiders. People have a sense of solidarity, unity, and belonging, and identify with the collectivity; they think of themselves as being all the same in some significant respect, not as individuals but as 'we.' (Fiske, 1991, 13-14).

Communal Sharing groups can be formed based on any number of characteristics that provide binding material, such as familial ties, shared ethnicity, religion, or nationality. Any of these groupings has the potential to produce distinct "equivalence classes," within which there do not exist any numerical comparisons across individuals — all have the same rank as part of the CS group (Fiske and Tetlock, 1997). CS interactions are associated with an emphasis on commonalities and with doing things for other group members without a necessary expectation of reciprocity: a state in a Communal Sharing relationship with another will contribute to the first state's defense without concern for whether their assistance will be repaid in the future, as in a deeply integrated security community or Wendt's (1999) Kantian culture of anarchy (Rai and Fiske, 2011; Deutsch, 1961; Cronin, 1999). Decisions in CS groups are generally made by consensus. However, a comparison remains between those that share the CS relations and all "others" — the equality and helping behavior does not extend past the boundaries of the group.

Equality Matching (EM) relations aim for specific evenness or balance between those interacting. For example, relations marked by tit-for-tat interactions, in-kind reciprocity, and Hammurabi-style sanctions for offenses fall under this structure (Fiske, 2004). EM relations are typical among friends, colleagues, and peers. They imply specific rather than diffuse reciprocity: if I purchase a meal for a friend, I expect that she will return the favor in kind by paying for a future shared meal (though there is no specification about the time frame in which the deed must be repaid). Decisions in EM relations are made in democratic, one-person one-vote systems, and individuals are expected to contribute the same amount to common tasks. International institutions structured

according to majority voting decision rules, as in the UN General Assembly, exemplify this style of decision-making. Turn-taking and balance are the norms. Congressional log-rolling, where members of congress exchange votes on each other's proposals in order to advance their own interest, also abides by EM norms (Fiske, 1992). Importantly, while CS relations can promote aggression and conflict in the form of racism, genocide, and dehumanization, EM is associated instead with violence only in response to other violence, irrespective of the perpetrator (Fiske, 1992) — the type of tit-for-tat behavior that helps states overcome the iterated prisoners' dilemma and marked some trench warfare during WWI (improving the dismal position of the troops involved) (Axelrod, 1984).

2.2 Shaping Social Identity with Social Relations

Germane to the present problem, Fiske explicitly connects each model to the domain of social identity, noting that “each of the... models provides a basis for a distinct kind of identity or self for group members” (1991, 82). CS relations align closely with the conventional approach to building national communities, while EM offers a viable alternative more consistent with notions of multiculturalism (Taylor, 1994; Davies, Steele and Markus, 2008).

Communal Sharing (CS) groups are constituted by people who see each other as part of a single collective — as a “we” rather than as individuals (Fiske, 1991). Within the group, complete equality prevails and members strive for unity, but the boundary between those inside and outside of the group is stark — outsiders are excluded and likely to be viewed as a mass of undifferentiated “others” (Rai and Fiske, 2011; Fiske, 1991; Vodosek, 2000). They are “no different than bus, bushes, or stones” (Fiske, 1991, 130). Thus, a strong connection to a CS group can inspire violence on a massive scale. CS within a group — such as a nation — facilitates conflict against an outgroup because outsiders are all seen as part of the enemy. This insight lies at the core of theories about ethnic cleansing or genocide (Staub, 2000), but also applies in the case of nationalism as a driver of hawkish foreign policy, even though the mechanisms are not traditionally placed in a relational models context. When citizens emphasize their membership in a unified, culturally bound nation, a sense of superiority can push them toward less tolerance for outsiders and aggressive responses to threats. Putting any member of their group at risk is to do harm to the group as a whole, an action that must be punished — consider, for example, a person protecting their family or kin group from outsiders, or the reaction of nationalistic Americans to Muslims after 9/11. These are the very attitudes and

actions expected from members of a CS group. A strong identification built upon CS relations can produce the militant nationalism that concerns IR scholars, along with the positive bias, cooperation, and kindness within the nation that defines the trade-off at the core of this project.

A strong commitment to a CS group should not facilitate international cooperation. Within the group, cooperation and diffuse reciprocity extend only as far as the boundaries of membership. Individuals cooperate with one another to promote the welfare of the group as a whole, inspiring the loyalty and community that [Kymlicka \(1998\)](#) and other liberal nationalists advocate. This pattern does not translate to outgroup behavior, which in this context refers to international cooperation. Since community members place less trust in outsiders ([Brown, 2000](#)), it follows that they are less willing to engage in cooperative interactions with them. Strong attachment to a CS group should not inspire a greater predilection for external cooperation. In the realm of foreign policy, this means that a more fervent attachment to a nation, when CS structures the group, will not encourage positive attitudes toward international cooperation.

Equality Matching (EM) relations, in contrast, are defined by evenness and balance among group members. EM relations do not wholly preclude violence either within the group or with those outside, but the violence that results from EM differs markedly from the generalized intergroup aggression facilitated by CS relations. A person in an EM interaction will react to a slight from their peer with one of an equivalent level, but then stop so long as the other chooses to stop as well. Tit-for-tat reactions typically do not inspire the same level of hostility as does a threat to the unity of a CS group, and the feeling that harming one is harming the whole does not carry the same weight when social relations are structured according to EM ([Fiske, 1992](#)). A commitment to EM within a group and an understanding of one's social identity in terms of being one among equals should not inspire strong militaristic reactions to foreign policy crises — which dampens the otherwise expected connection between nationalism and hawkish foreign policy.

At the same time, EM relations can promote cooperation with outsiders. While technically the boundaries of CS groups are permeable and can permit the entry of a wider collection of people, as when social identity groups are expanded to include a wider range of subgroups ([Turner, 1985](#)), the desire for conformity and unity in the group make communities resistant to accommodating substantial diversity ([Mummendey and Waldzus, 2004](#); [Rai and Fiske, 2011](#)). With EM relations, though, a group's boundaries are easily extended to any actor who might maintain the expecta-

tions of fairness and reciprocity. This facilitates a positive attitude toward international cooperation, where a person might expect reciprocity from outside actors. We already know that choosing ‘cooperate’ on the first move begins the winning strategy in an iterated prisoners’ dilemma, where tit-for-tat prevails in preventing mutual defection (Axelrod, 1984), and Habyarimana et al. (2007) find that reciprocity norms drive cooperative collective action in diverse ethnic groups — lending support to the notion that an EM identity can promote external cooperation.

The social relations that underlie the dominant social identity in a nation shape individuals’ foreign policy preferences. A strong commitment to the nation as a CS group inspires more conflictual attitudes, but not more cooperation, while EM predicts cooperation with outgroups rather than conflict. I test this theory in the context of foreign policy attitudes following the tradition of scholars concerned with the impact of nationalism and patriotism at the micro-level. Much of what IR scholars conclude regarding the role of identities broadly, and national identities specifically, relies on individual level psychology for its microfoundations. Thus, I test my claims at this level to determine whether the connection between national identification and conflictual or cooperative foreign policy is more complex than current scholarship implies.

3 Hypotheses

I expect that when a national identity is built upon Communal Sharing (CS) or Equality Matching (EM) social structures, there will be differences in the extent to which a person promotes aggressive reactions to a conflictual foreign policy event. A complete test of the theory, though, must incorporate the notion of identity *strength*, and not the relational structure (and resulting social identity) alone. As Huddy (2001) notes, identification varies along a number of dimensions, one of which is the degree of an individual’s commitment to that identity. Political scientists know, for example, that strong and weak partisans behave differently from one another (Klar, 2013) just as strong national or transnational identities produce different outcomes from weak ones (Mummendey and Wenzel, 1999). Sindic and Reicher (2009) conduct a study that, as in the present investigation, concerns itself with both the content and degree of a national identity. They find in Scotland that Scots who feel that their identity is being undermined by their membership in the United Kingdom — where the government, to them, imposes English values that are inconsistent with Scottish culture

— are only strong supporters of separatism when they also strongly identify with Scotland. Indeed, respondents who experienced identity undermining but expressed low levels of national identification reported a greater degree of support for maintaining the union, not less. The relationship changes depending on the strength of the national identity.

Similarly, I expect that the differences between a national identity based on an EM or CS relational model should manifest themselves at higher levels of national identification, but not lower. Where a strong CS identity has been established, a person will prefer more conflictual responses to foreign policy crises. In contrast, a strong national identity rooted in EM should predict a greater willingness to cooperate with outside actors, but not more conflict.

Conceptually, national identification carries a host of distinct meanings, having been deconstructed many times over – by [Huddy and Khatib \(2007\)](#), [Schatz, Staub and Lavine \(1999\)](#) and [Herrmann, Isernia and Segatti \(2009\)](#), for example. The latter propose a 3-dimensional measure of national identification, and expressly test the connection between their scales and foreign policy preferences, providing an appropriate foil for the current investigation. They find that higher levels of national chauvinism are associated with foreign policy militarism,⁶ while strong national attachment predicts more cooperative approaches to international politics.⁷ I expect that these relationships are dependent upon relational models — the structures of social interaction that shape individuals’ understanding of the national identity group.

Hypothesis 1: Relational models moderate the relationship between national chauvinism and conflictual foreign policy preferences. Equality Matching will weaken the relationship between national chauvinism and preferences for conflictual foreign policy, relative to Communal Sharing.

Hypothesis 2: Relational models moderate the relationship between national attachment and cooperative foreign policy preferences. Equality Matching will strengthen the relationship between national attachment and preferences for cooperative foreign policy, relative to Communal Sharing.

⁶This construct is similar to the more generic “nationalism” label used by other scholars, implying a commitment to the superiority of one’s nation ([De Figueiredo and Elkins, 2003](#)).

⁷National attachment refers to an individuals’ sense of belongingness and commitment to the nation, a concept similar to [Huddy and Khatib’s \(2007\)](#) “national identification” or the common academic use of “patriotism” ([De Figueiredo and Elkins, 2003](#))

I further suggest that the relational models will affect attitudes toward outgroups, such that those adhering to an EM understanding of their national identity will be less likely to see outgroup members in a negative light. Respecting differences in their own multicultural nation should produce little outward animosity, while the clashing identities that define the boundary between a CS group and those who lie outside of that unified collective should generate more negative attitudes toward outgroup members.

Hypothesis 3: Relational models will moderate the relationship between strength of national identity and negative views of the outgroup. National chauvinism will be positively associated with negative perceptions of the outgroup when the nation is built on Communal Sharing relations, but not when it is built upon Equality Matching.

4 Do Relational Models Shape the Connection Between Nationalism and Foreign Policy Attitudes?

4.1 Methods and Materials

I conducted an online experiment in 2014 to assess how different structures of social relations in a nation impact foreign policy attitudes. Using a sample recruited from [Amazon.com's Mechanical Turk](#), I manipulated the social relations and purported norms that prevail in a fictional country (Fredonia) and asked participants to imagine themselves to be citizens of this place before responding to a conflict with a neighboring state. Using this fictional scenario and country enables me to establish a baseline for the impact of relational models on foreign policy attitudes, national identity, and outgroup impressions — with minimal influence from an individual's real conceptions of their relations with co-nationals or other facets of existing national identities. However, because it also involves building a nation from scratch, through an internet survey, absent the social processes that normally lead to the over time development of identities, this study also presents a hard case for observing the effects of relational models – somewhat akin to [Tajfel and Turner's \(1979\)](#) minimal group paradigm.

The sample was composed of 301 adult participants, 53.6% of whom identified as male and 78.35% as White/Caucasian. ⁸ They were all located in the U.S. and ranged in age from 19-68

⁸I retained response latency data for the time that participants spent reading the manipulation paragraphs. I elimi-

(median age 33 years).⁹ Samples from Mechanical Turk are not representative of the American population, but they are increasingly becoming typical of research in the social sciences (including top political science journals – see [Tomz and Weeks, 2013](#), [Huber, Hill and Lenz, 2012](#), and [Healy and Lenz, 2014](#) for examples), both for ease of sample recruitment and for data quality. MTurk samples have been used to replicate classic findings from research in political science and political psychology ([Berinsky, Huber and Lenz, 2012](#)), and while non-representative, they are typically more diverse than the student samples that comprise much psychological and political science research. For example, 45.51% of this sample have already obtained a bachelor's degree or higher, and 48.8% report a household income of greater than \$40,000 per year — making this sample more diverse than one comprised of college students.¹⁰ Moreover, the experimental design that I employ maximizes internal validity through the use of random assignment to make claims about causality, even though external validity may be limited by the sample.

4.2 Design and Measures

Following an informed consent procedure, the single factor, between subjects experiment proceeded in 5 steps. (1) Participants were exposed to one of three experimental conditions and completed a writing task. (2) Participants were asked about their identification with Fredonia. (3) Participants were presented with a conflict scenario between Fredonia and a neighboring state (Rusburg), and chose their preferred foreign policy response over 3 stages of the conflict's escalation. (4) Participants completed a battery of additional questions measuring their cooperative/militant foreign policy orientations as well as their moral foundations and social dominance orientation. (5) The survey ended with a series of demographic and political knowledge items.

First, participants in all conditions were told to imagine that they are citizens of a fictional country – Fredonia – and they were provided with information about Fredonia's size and population (297,000 square miles and 34 million people, respectively – these numbers are based on the global

nated the bottom 5% of participants, in the experimental conditions, who spent too little time on the manipulations to have taken the study seriously. The analyses below report the data from the remaining 291 observations.

⁹I followed the advice of [Berinsky, Huber and Lenz \(2012\)](#) on compensation and restrictions to recruit this sample. Participants were required to be at least 18 years old, located in the U.S., and have completed at least 100 Human Intelligence Tasks (HITs) with a 95% approval rating. They were compensated \$1.00 for their participation. I acknowledge support from the Mershon Center for International Security Studies to fund this study.

¹⁰In addition, results from Mechanical Turk studies have been replicated in nationally representative samples ([Healy and Lenz, 2014](#); [Weinberg, Freese and McElhattan, 2014](#)).

means for country area and population). In the control condition, participants did not receive any more information and were directed to a page asking them to write about an unrelated topic. In the experimental conditions, participants were told that Fredonians in the past held animosity toward each other across group lines, but recently have developed relations based on either Communal Sharing (CS) or Equality Matching (EM) that have eliminated the intergroup hostility within the state. This mimics — in a short, experimental manipulation — the process through which competing ethnic subgroups within a state are bound by newly created national identity in order to reduce conflict.

The language identifying the relational norms in each condition was drawn from three sources to tap the concepts directly: (1) Fiske's (1991) master table, which shows how each model operates in various domains such as decision-making and social identity, (2) the confirmatory factor analysis of relational models items from Haslam and Fiske (1999), and (3) Fiske and Tetlock's (1997) experiments investigating taboo trade-offs using relational models theory. The experimental manipulations were similar in length and each discussed norms of exchange, decision-making, and identity, maximizing control over all but the constructs of interest. In the CS scenario, participants were told that citizens of Fredonia are now “unified as a community” and “have similar values,” while the EM condition specifies that Fredonians “differ in many ways, but... generally think of one another as equals.”¹¹

Because these manipulations were fairly subtle, and the task later asks participants to report the strength of their identification with a novel, hypothetical country, the manipulations were followed with a writing task. Participants were directed to spend 3 minutes writing about the benefits of Fredonia's social relational norms. Specifically, they were prompted to discuss how the establishment of community (CS) or equality (EM) is positive for the country — further cementing the salient components of the EM or CS social relations and encouraging participants to meaningfully connect with Fredonia.

Participants then responded to a series of questions about their Fredonian identity. After they were told the content of Fredonian identity through the stimulus paragraph and wrote about it, participants were asked to think about how they would feel about being Fredonian. Because national identity is a multifaceted concept, as discussed above, the study included scales for the three facets

¹¹See Appendix §1 for the full text of each experimental condition and directions for the writing task.

of national identification that [Herrmann, Isernia and Segatti \(2009\)](#) identify in their assessment of national identity and its relationship to cooperation and conflict in Italy and the U.S.: national attachment, national chauvinism, and culturalism.¹² I include the first two to assess hypotheses 1 and 2, which state that relational models will moderate the relationships between chauvinism and conflict, and between attachment and cooperation.

National attachment refers to an individual's general feeling that they belong to the nation. The three items included to measure national attachment ($\alpha = 0.804$) probe how an individual's self-concept is related to the group, and whether they feel a sense of shared fate with the nation. [Herrmann, Isernia and Segatti \(2009\)](#) find a positive association between national attachment and preferences for international cooperation in their American sample, but attachment on its own is unrelated to conflictual preferences. I argue that this positive relationship between attachment and international cooperation will be stronger when a nation is built on EM relations, as stated in Hypothesis 2.

The second identity scale, national chauvinism ($\alpha = 0.583$), measures how strongly people believe that Fredonia is superior to other nations and whether the world would be better off if more countries were like Fredonia. This feeling of patriotic superiority typically underlies claims about the connection between nationalism and war. Chauvinism drives individuals toward conflict and away from cooperation, fulfilling the scope conditions that produce an association between strong social identity and conflict under competitive conditions ([Brewer, 1999](#); [Brown, 2000](#)). I argue in Hypothesis 1 that this should only be the case when the identity relies on a shared sense of communality (CS), because EM relations do not privilege the unity of a single group to the same extent.

Finally, I include a scale measuring culturalism ($\alpha = 0.733$) as a manipulation check to determine whether the Communal Sharing stimulus has the expected impact on individuals' understanding of Fredonian relations. The culturalism scale asks whether certain characteristics — a shared language, religion, heritage, and culture/values — are essential for being truly Fredonian. Members of a group based on CS relations should see these elements as important to being part of the Fredonian nation. However, EM relations stress the equal value of individuals rather than elements of commonality. Participants in the EM condition should express lower levels of culturalism, compared to those in the CS condition, providing a check on the manipulations.

¹²See Appendix §2 for a list of the items that comprise each scale.

In the foreign policy conflict scenario, participants are informed that Fredonia is in a long-standing territorial dispute with Rusburg. Rusburg is described as a neighboring country whose people are “culturally different than Fredonians, speaking a distinct language and following different traditions,” in order to establish them as different and highlight the contrast between Rusburg and Fredonia. In the vignette, citizens from each country occupy a swath of territory that lies between them, and both countries claim ownership over this territory. Across 3 stages, violence in the territory escalates, with fault attributed to both sides so as to introduce enough ambiguity that reasonable participants could conceivably choose from an array of responses. At each of the three stages, the survey asks how Fredonia should respond to the situation. They choose from 8 (at stage 1) or 9 options (in stages 2 and 3, where escalating a declared war is an option), ranging from least to most conflictual. I tailored the items to suit the vignette, but they were strongly influenced by Goldstein’s (1992) scale of cooperative and conflictual foreign policy. Goldstein (1992) introduces a detailed scale for WEIS events data, to address the shortcomings of previous versions of the scale, placing foreign policy actions in order from most cooperative to most conflictual. This scale is widely used in international relations research, and drawing from it lends validity to the claim that the response options are ordered appropriately and amenable to analysis with statistical models that rely on an ordered dependent variable.¹³

After the first stage, participants are also asked about the type of strategy that Fredonia should pursue, using three word-pairs – passive/aggressive, cooperative/conflictual, peaceful/hostile (three-item scale $\alpha = 0.839$) – drawn from Schafer (1999). They further report their view of Rusburgians as unfriendly/ friendly, peaceful/belligerent, untrustworthy/trustworthy, and uncooperative/ cooperative ($\alpha = 0.93$; Schafer, 1999). These measures present the opportunity to address Hypothesis 3, to determine whether individuals view the outgroup as more hostile or in a generally negative light depending on the structure of their own national group. Critics of the liberal nationalist tradition argue that enhanced national self-esteem should inspire negative outgroup assessments (Spinner-Halev and Theiss-Morse, 2003), but my theory suggests that EM relations will dampen that relationship.

Following the scenario, participants completed scales tapping two additional dependent variables of interest: cooperative and militant internationalism. Cooperative internationalism ($\alpha =$

¹³See Appendix §3 for the full text of possible policy options.

0.842) measures the extent to which an individual supports the U.S. working with other countries and international organizations to resolve global problems, while militant internationalism ($\alpha = 0.872$) refers to a person's support for the use of the U.S. military to pursue the state's goals abroad (Wittkopf, 1990). Each scale is composed of five items drawn from Wittkopf (1990) and subsequent work investigating the latent structure of foreign policy attitudes. The short scales contain items that remain relevant in the post Cold War era and that have also appeared in more recent research (Kertzer et al., 2014).¹⁴ Including these measures provides the opportunity to determine the impact of the relational model treatments on individuals' more general orientations toward foreign policy, outside of the hypothetical crisis scenario.¹⁵ Further, while the vignette focuses on conflict, measuring cooperative internationalism post-treatment provides a test of the theory's predictions about support for external cooperation, in addition to conflict.

Finally, participants completed a series of questions measuring four of their moral foundations – tradition/authority, ingroup/loyalty, harm/care, and fairness/reciprocity (Graham, Haidt and Nosek, 2009) – along with interest in foreign policy, political knowledge, ideology, party identification, and demographic characteristics. This battery also included a short scale for social dominance orientation (Pratto et al., 1994, 2013), a personality characteristic that prizes hierarchy among groups rather than equality, and that positively predicts conflictual policy preferences.

5 Results

I present the results of this experiment in two sections. First, I examine which variables predict outcomes specific to the vignette: how do CS and EM interact with national identity to shape participants' choice of more or less conflictual policy options? Under what conditions do participants view Rusburgians in a more negative light? I assess whether the treatments shape the relationship between reported levels of national identification and preferred policy options or negative views

¹⁴See Appendix §2 for a complete list of scale items measuring cooperative and militant internationalism. The Cronbach's alpha statistics for these scales indicate that they are highly reliable, at levels comparable to those found in other research (Kertzer et al., 2014). The two scales have are moderately correlated at -0.32 , alleviating concerns that the high reliability is due to an acquiescence bias.

¹⁵I maintain the standard MI and CI measures, which refer to the U.S. rather than Fredonia, for two reasons. First, these measures separate the orientations from the specific threat posed by Rusburg, key to a test of whether the theory holds for more general preferences. Second, if my theory is correct, attachment to an EM group should increase preferences for cooperation across contexts while that attachment remains salient – having written about the benefits of EM or CS within a state, participants attached to that notion should extend its tenets in their broader views as Americans.

of the outgroup. In the second section, I analyze the impact of the treatments on the relationship between national identity and abstract orientations toward foreign policy, with cooperative and militant internationalism as the dependent variables.

5.1 Manipulation Checks

Before turning to these results, the experiment includes 2 opportunities to confirm that the manipulations targeted the correct constructs. I present the results of these manipulation checks here. First, participants in the Communal Sharing group indeed understood shared cultural values, implied by a CS approach to the constitution of groups, to be an important element of being Fredonian. An ANOVA demonstrates that the three conditions differ in terms of the mean levels of culturalism ($F = 15.9, p < 0.001$), and a series of pairwise comparisons reveals that those in the CS group reported higher levels of culturalism than both participants in the control ($p < 0.001$) and Equality Matching conditions ($p < 0.001$), while the mean in the EM condition did not differ significantly from the control ($p = 0.888$).

Additionally, by measuring individuals' moral foundations post-treatment, I can determine whether participants report a greater commitment to ingroup/loyalty values in the CS condition, and fairness in the EM condition. As [Graham et al. \(2013\)](#) writes, much of the underlying framework and motivation for moral foundations theory was drawn from [Fiske's \(1991\)](#) work. The ingroup/loyalty foundation, for example, is based in part upon features that define CS relations, while fairness/reciprocity engages the ideas about equal chances and reciprocal exchange that mark EM interactions. While changes in the strength of a moral value represents a high bar for testing the manipulations employed here, because they are relatively stable attitudes,¹⁶ differences across conditions can further confirm the efficacy of the treatments. The conditions differ from one another in reported levels of moral commitment to the ingroup ($F = 2.963, p = 0.053$), and in the expected directions. Those in the CS condition more strongly value the ingroup than those in the EM condition ($mean_{CS} = 0.62, mean_{EM} = 0.57, p = 0.05$; rescaled with 1 as the maximum value), though the difference between CS and the control does not attain traditional levels of statistical significance ($mean_{Control} = 0.58, p = 0.16$). The strength of ingroup values in the control and EM conditions

¹⁶Given the subtlety of the manipulations and the challenges inherent in shifting a person's deeply held values, I do not expect that the manipulations caused dramatic changes, but rather that they made different moral foundations more salient.

do not differ from one another ($p = 0.82$), which is consistent with expectations that neither the control nor EM manipulations should target ingroup values.

The results for fairness are more ambiguous. The ANOVA reveals that we cannot reject the null hypothesis, but the F statistic approaches statistical significance ($F = 0.2098, p = 0.125$). A series of pairwise comparisons reveals that the difference between the EM condition and control ($mean_{EM} = 0.781, mean_{Control} = 0.746$) appears to be in the expected direction as it approaches statistical significance ($p = 0.12$). However, the control and CS conditions do not differ in mean fairness values ($mean_{CS} = 0.753$), nor do the data support the claim that participants in the EM condition are committed to fairness to a greater degree than those in CS. Ceiling effects present one possible reason for the failure to reject the null hypothesis: individuals cluster toward the top of the scale in terms of how much they claim to value fairness, with only 12% of the sample scoring lower than 0.61. In general, the three manipulation checks validate that the CS manipulation targets the intended construct. While these data cannot reject the null that the EM manipulation does not impact fairness values, it seems clear that it does not tap into the same shared community concepts.

5.2 Foreign Policy Crisis: Responses to the Rusburgian Conflict

The analyses here focus on the later stages of the conflict – stages 2 and 3 – along with the total escalation between stages 1 and 3. In stage 1, participants were introduced to the conflict through the vignette, but this description involved relatively minimal levels of violence. The vignette set the stage for the later escalation of the conflict, but with low stakes (police from each country were attempting to enforce the territory as either Fredonia's or Rusburg's). I thus expected little variation in participants' preferred policy choices. Indeed, across conditions only 38 participants escalated past the 3rd option in stage 1 (making a formal request that Rusburg withdraw their claim), and 79% of the sample chose options 1 or 2: welcoming Rusburgians to a shared space or negotiating a peaceful partition of the territory.¹⁷

Table 1 presents the results of three OLS models predicting participants' preferred foreign policy options at stages 2 and 3, as well as the total escalation between stages 1 and 3 (the difference between

¹⁷To confirm that responses were similar across conditions at stage 1, I created a dichotomous version of the stage 1 response variable, coded 0 if the respondents chose the most cooperative option and 1 if they chose level 2 or greater. A simple logistic regression model confirms that the probability of choosing the most cooperative option or one that is more conflictual does not differ across conditions. See the appendix §5 for these results.

the options chosen at stage 3, the highest point of the crisis, and stage 1, the lowest point).¹⁸ The first two dependent variables are rescaled from 0 to 1, while the total escalation can vary from -1 to 1 (actual range -0.625 to 1) due to a small number of participants backing down from their early conflictual preferences as the situation described in the vignettes escalated. All other variables are rescaled from 0 to 1 in order to facilitate interpretation of the coefficients and effect sizes. Because my theory primarily concerns the effects of EM compared to CS, the results in Table 1 omit the Control group and include the Equality Matching condition as a dummy variable coded 1 if the participant was assigned to the EM condition, and 0 if they were instead exposed to a CS national identity building exercise. The models also include national chauvinism as an independent variable to determine the relationship between this construct and the outcomes of interest. Finally, and most directly relevant to hypothesis 1, the models include terms for the interaction between the treatment condition and reported levels of national chauvinism – in order to determine whether the treatment group moderates the relationship between chauvinism and conflictual foreign policy preferences.

First, model 1 shows that neither the treatments nor a participant's reported level of national chauvinism were associated with the policy choice at stage 2 of the conflict. However, even stage 2 presents a relatively low stakes conflict. At stage 2, participants are told that their previous policy choice, at stage 1, was unsuccessful and that about 45 people (from both countries) died in clashes between police enforcing their claims over the land. By the time the conflict escalates to stage 3, though, differences are clear.

Models 2 and 3 from Table 1 draw attention to the fact that while both national chauvinism and the Equality Matching treatment appear to have a positive impact on more conflictual policy choices, those positive and significant coefficients belie an important interaction between the treatment group and national chauvinism ($b = -0.473$ in model 2 and $b = -0.302$ in model 3; $p < 0.1$). That is, the association between national chauvinism and both outcome variables differs

¹⁸Ordinary Least Squares regression assumes an ordinal interval dependent variable, in which values are not only ordered but the interval between values is constant across the scale. In this case, the foreign policy choice options are ordered (Goldstein, 1992), but intervals may not be equally spaced. Since the dependent variables measured here involve lengthy scales, OLS remains a useful estimation tool. However, I estimated an ordered logit model to ascertain the robustness of the results when the OLS assumption of equal intervals is relaxed. For both the third stage of the response and the total escalation, an ordered logit confirmed the interaction between chauvinism and the experimental condition reported in Table 1. The coefficient of the interaction between Equality Matching and chauvinism is negative and statistically significant, and inspection of the predicted probabilities shows that in the Communal Sharing condition, the predicted probability of choosing more conflictual responses increases with chauvinism while the predicted probability of choosing more cooperative responses decreases – consistent with the OLS results.

Table 1: Conflictual Foreign Policy Preferences, Relational Models, and National Chauvinism

	Stage 2 Response (1)	Stage 3 Response (2)	Total Escalation (3)
Equality Matching	0.175 (0.138)	0.288* (0.164)	0.169* (0.097)
National Chauvinism	0.231 (0.175)	0.364* (0.207)	0.258** (0.123)
EM x Chauvinism	-0.272 (0.235)	-0.473* (0.278)	-0.302* (0.165)
Constant	0.165 (0.103)	0.267** (0.122)	0.454*** (0.073)
N	180	180	180
R ²	0.012	0.020	0.025


* $p < .1$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$

Note: Main entries are OLS coefficients. The reference group for Equality Matching is the Communal Sharing condition. All other variables are rescaled from 0 to 1.

based on whether a participant sees themselves as part of a Fredonia that is defined by CS or EM (and the coefficient on the EM treatment is only positive at very low levels of chauvinism). Recall that chauvinism is measured by a person's determination that their nation is superior to others, and that the world would be a better place if others nations were more like theirs. Those who wrote about Equality Matching, then, should have been thinking about the strength of their chauvinism in the terms provided by the prompt: an increasingly strong level of chauvinism in the EM condition refers to a strong preference for equal, peer-like relations in the Fredonian nation as well as abroad. In contrast, chauvinism for those in the CS condition has a different meaning — it considers the superiority of the Fredonian culture and community in comparison to other countries. The strength of national chauvinism has a conceptually distinct meaning if a person responds from the perspective of an EM or CS group, which informs the discussion of the interaction.

The two plots in Figure 1 display these interactions more clearly. As the strength of national chauvinism increases, past work leads us to expect conflictual policy preferences to rise in tandem. Yet, this is true only when the Communal Sharing relations shape the constitution of the Fredonian nation — for both the response at stage 3 and the total escalation of the conflict between stages 1 and 3. For participants in the Equality Matching condition, the relationship reverses: stronger chauvinistic identification with the nation is associated with *less* conflictual policy choices at stage 3

Figure 1: Relational Model Moderates the Relationship Between National Chauvinism and Foreign Policy Aggression



Note: Variables are rescaled from 0 to 1. Shaded bands depict 90% confidence intervals.

and less escalation through the scenario, though the latter relationship is only weakly negative, suggesting at least that participants in the EM condition do not escalate more over time with increases in chauvinism. Even as violence in stage 3 reached a bomb that killed more than 100 people in the territory, participants who strongly identified with Fredonia and lauded its Equality Matching structure were less outwardly hostile, a result that supports Hypothesis 1.

One concern in interpreting this interaction is that it could be an artifact of the fact that the distribution of national chauvinism differs across the two experimental conditions. A simple t-test confirms that the mean levels of chauvinism do not differ between EM and CS ($mean_{CS} = 0.57$, $mean_{EM} = 0.56$, $t = 0.37$). Further, I test the difference between the probability distributions of national chauvinism using a bootstrapped version of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, which indicates that the two experimental subsamples – EM and CS – do not differ ($D = 0.004$, $p = 1$). The distribution of chauvinism in each experimental condition does, however, differ from the control group as expected (for EM, $D = 0.12$ and $p = 0.002$, for CS $D = 0.12$ and $p = 0.001$).

The confidence intervals in Figure 1 are wide, due to the relatively small number of observa-

tions in each experimental condition given the subtlety of the manipulations.¹⁹ The interaction is statistically significant, though, and the change from low to high levels of chauvinism is associated with a meaningful positive change in both the stage 3 response and total escalation for participants in the Communal Sharing group.²⁰ In the CS treatment group, moving from the minimum to the maximum levels of national chauvinism (minimum = 0.18, maximum = 0.93), is associated with an increase on the dependent variable. At the minimum level of chauvinism, the predicted response for participants in the CS condition is 0.33 [0.19, 0.47] (90% confidence interval in brackets) — just shy of requesting that Rusburg withdraw their claim to the territory. At the maximum, the model predicts a value of 0.60 [0.47, 0.74] on the outcome variable. This results in a change of 0.27 units on the 0-1 scale, or the equivalent of moving up roughly two steps on the dependent variable — from the request to withdraw to breaking off diplomatic relations and beginning military exercises, a substantively significant jump. The upper bound of the 90% confidence interval on the minimum just touches the lower bound of the predicted value at the maximum, providing reasonable confidence that this relationship is truly positive.

In contrast, consider the predicted values along the same range of chauvinism for participants in the EM condition. When chauvinism is 0.18, the model predicts a value of 0.53 [0.41, 0.66] on the stage 3 response, but 0.45 [0.33, 0.58] when chauvinism is high – a decrease of 0.08, or about half a level on the full response scale. The overlapping confidence intervals suggest that we cannot conclude that this relationship is negative, but it is unlikely that it is positive, lending credence to the claim that the relationship between chauvinism and conflictual foreign policy differs depending on the relational model treatment.

The contrast between the two conditions is more stark when we consider total escalation as the outcome of interest. In the Communal Sharing condition, participants who reported low levels of national chauvinism (0.18) escalated the conflict by nearly 4 levels between stages 1 and 3, or the difference between making the territory a shared space and threatening the use of force ($\hat{y} = 0.50$ [0.42, 0.59]). At high levels of chauvinism, the predicted escalation is 0.69 [0.61, 0.81], or about

¹⁹Moreover, [Krupnikov and Levine \(2014, 77\)](#) show that experiments on Mechanical Turk samples that require substantial ‘buy-in’ from participants – such as those that involve reading a long article or trusting information from the experimenter – tend to produce weaker effects than those observed in laboratory samples. While my observation of the writing selections suggests that most participants understood the manipulations and took the task seriously, it is possible that the nature of my sample accounts for wider variation.

²⁰Thank you to Chris Gelpi for a helpful discussion on this point.

5 levels on the scale. This difference amounts to adding slightly more than 1 step to the conflict's escalation — which could mean the difference between sanctions and a military strike ($\Delta\hat{y} = 0.19$). Moreover, the confidence intervals do not overlap; taken together, these points support my claim that the positive relationship between national chauvinism and escalation is both substantively and statistically significant.

In the Equality Matching condition, the relationship between chauvinism and escalation appears negative but is statistically negligible – $\hat{y} = 0.62$ [0.54, 0.69] at the low end of the chauvinism scale, and 0.58 [0.51, 0.66] at the high end – for a difference of 0.04. Thus, across both dependent variables the slope is positive in the CS condition, but not in the EM condition. National chauvinism is positively associated with conflict, but only where a group is defined in terms of a shared community.

5.3 Do Chauvinistic Fredonians View the Outgroup Negatively?

Table 2: Negative View of Outgroup and Strategy Choice, Relational Models, and National Identity

	Negative View of Rusburgians (4)	Aggressive Strategy (5)
Equality Matching	-0.204** (0.101)	-0.049 (0.100)
National Chauvinism	-0.017 (0.126)	-0.272** (0.125)
EM x Chauvinism	0.341* (0.173)	0.187 (0.172)
Social Dominance Orientation	0.105 (0.067)	0.341*** (0.066)
Male	-0.044 (0.029)	0.009 (0.029)
Constant	0.578*** (0.077)	0.271*** (0.077)
N	180	180
R ²	0.058	0.183

* $p < .1$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$

Note: Main entries are OLS coefficients. The reference group for Equality Matching is the Communal Sharing condition. Identity variables and social dominance orientation are rescaled from 0 to 1. Higher values of the dependent variable indicate more negative views of the outgroup and more aggressive strategy preferences.

The next two models, presented in Table 2, estimate the impact of several independent vari-


ables on two measures that were taken following the first stage of the scenario: the participant's assessment of whether they would pursue a more peaceful or more aggressive/conflictual strategy, and how they view the outgroup (Rusburgians) in the conflict. The measures of negative outgroup views address Hypothesis 3, while the preference for an aggressive strategy offers an additional test of conflictual foreign policy. In addition to the dummy variable for the experimental treatment, national chauvinism, and the interaction, this model includes controls for sex as well as an individual's social dominance orientation in order to assess the role of individual differences.

Model 4 predicts negative views of the outgroup, a dependent variable measured after stage 1 of the conflict by participant assessments of Rusburgians as friendly/unfriendly, peaceful/belligerent, untrustworthy/trustworthy, and uncooperative/cooperative. The scores on each of these dimensions are combined to produce an additive scale, which is rescaled from 0 to 1 in the model reported here, where higher values indicate more negative views of Rusburgians. The results show a presumably negative relationship between the Equality Matching treatment and negative views, suggesting that those in the EM treatment group see Rusburgians in a less negative light overall. Once again this coefficient cannot be interpreted without accounting for the interaction, as it represents only the effect at the lowest levels of chauvinism. Contrary to expectations, the coefficient on the interaction between EM and national chauvinism is positive ($b = 0.341$), indicating a positive relationship between EM-based nationalism and negative outgroup attitudes.

Figure 2 displays this result graphically and reveals a pattern that would not be obvious observing the coefficients alone. Here it appears that those in the CS condition, relative to EM, see the outgroup more negatively when their identity is weak, but that increases in identity strength do not change the mean outcome — the slope of the Communal Sharing line is close to 0. In contrast, there is a clear positive relationship between chauvinism and negative outgroup attitudes for EM. In this fictional scenario, people who hold strong chauvinistic views of their nation's EM relations also hold more negative attitudes toward Rusburgians, but based on the results reported in the previous section, this does not appear to translate to their foreign policy preferences.

The results of model 5 show that national chauvinism negatively predicts the choice to pursue an aggressive strategy ($b = -0.272$), again contrary to expectations and to the findings from later stages of the crisis scenario. The coefficient on the interaction between EM and chauvinism is not statistically significant. Since both of these measures were taken immediately following the first

Figure 2: Chauvinism and Negative Outgroup Attitudes by Relational Model



Note: Variables are rescaled from 0 to 1. Shaded bands depict 90% confidence intervals.

stage of the conflict, however, the inconsistencies in the results are likely due to the limited scale of the conflict as initially presented. With very low-level threats and competition, the dynamic relationships between identity strength and conflictual foreign policy preferences are not apparent — consistent with Brewer’s (1999) conclusion that “outgroup hate” does not flow automatically absent activation by competition. Producing negative attitudes requires the right structural conditions, which may not have been present after the limited violence described in stage 1.

Instead, social dominance orientation, a dispositional trait, emerges as a strong positive predictor of choosing to pursue an aggressive strategy after stage 1. Closely tied to the concept of equality matching, people who are low in social dominance orientation prefer equal societies. Those who score high on the scale believe that some groups are superior to others, and prefer to live in a hierarchical society. The finding that social dominance orientation predicts negative outgroup attitudes and aggressive policy preferences is not novel (see e.g. Pratto et al., 1994), but interpreted in light of relational models theory the positive coefficient offers some support for the theory proposed in this dissertation: people who generally support equality-based relations choose less hawkish strategies in a foreign policy conflict. The implicit contrast to EM in measures of social dominance orienta-

tion, though, is one of hierarchical social relations and not Communal Sharing — suggesting that some caution is necessary in interpreting this result in the context of my theory.

5.4 Militant and Cooperative Internationalism

Following their decisions in the hypothetical scenario, participants were asked about their general cooperative and militant orientations toward U.S. foreign policy. These variables were thus measured post-treatment, enabling an analysis of whether the treatments also moderated the relationship between identity strength and these scales of hawkishness and dovishness, both of which feature prominently in literature on foreign policy attitudes (Wittkopf, 1990; Kertzer et al., 2014).²¹

Because separate scales measure an individual’s militant and cooperative foreign policy preferences — the two are considered orthogonal constructs rather than ends of a continuum — these measures provide an opportunity in an experiment otherwise focused on conflict, hawkishness, and negative outgroup attitudes to determine the impact of relational models on more explicitly cooperative preferences. Table 3 displays the results of separate analyses predicting levels of cooperative and militant internationalism.

In previous work, researchers analyzed large national surveys in two countries to find that national attachment — a non-competitive connection to one’s nation — is positively associated with cooperative foreign policy dispositions (Herrmann, Isernia and Segatti, 2009), the kind of outcome that liberal nationalists would hope for. However, mirroring the above results that investigated the interaction between relational models and national chauvinism on conflictual preferences, I find support for that conclusion only when relations are shaped by Equality Matching.

This provides evidence to support Hypothesis 2, that there is a strong positive association between national attachment and cooperative internationalism but only for the EM treatment group. In other words, greater levels of attachment produce more cooperative foreign policy tendencies when the national identity is constituted by EM norms — but not when it is based on CS. The in-

²¹While some view militant and cooperative internationalism as stable predispositions, Joshua D. Kertzer and I find in other work that they represent general views about the world that are subject to change based on foreign policy events (Kertzer and Powers, 2014). This is similar to work by some operational code scholars, who have found that a leader’s operational code — her “philosophical and instrumental beliefs about the nature and use of power in the international system” can change in response to evolving situations in global politics (Renshon, 2009, 650). Thus, I have reason to expect that Militant and Cooperative Internationalism can be understood as dependent variables open to manipulation rather than as stable predispositions to include as controls.

dividuals who hold a strong patriotic commitment to their EM state do so because they find the notions of equality and fairness compelling, leading them to extend that commitment outward.

Table 3: Relational Models, Identity Strength and Foreign Policy Orientations

	Cooperative Internationalism (6)	Militant Internationalism (7)
Equality Matching	-0.163* (0.096)	0.128 (0.100)
National Attachment	-0.120 (0.098)	
EM x Attachment	0.288** (0.133)	
National Chauvinism		0.242* (0.124)
EM x Chauvinism		-0.233 (0.170)
Social Dominance Orientation	-0.447*** (0.055)	0.214*** (0.065)
Constant	0.874*** (0.078)	0.454*** (0.074)
N	180	180
R ²	0.321	0.086


*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Note: Main entries are OLS coefficients. The reference group for Equality Matching is the Communal Sharing condition. All other variables are rescaled from 0 to 1. Higher values of the dependent variables indicate greater levels of cooperative or militant internationalism.

Those who are only weakly attached to a Fredonian identity based on EM, in contrast, are less likely to share a Fredonian vision of pluralistic equality and so their tendency toward cooperation is no greater than those in the CS condition. Figure 3 displays this stark interaction. There is a clear positive slope for the line that represents the EM group, and a slightly negative slope in the CS condition (though the wide confidence band suggest that the slope may be 0, and not negative). For international cooperation, the benefits of people being attached to their nation and seeing themselves intertwined with it are conditional upon how a person understands social relations in the nation.

The results from the concrete Rusburgian conflict scenario do not appear to hold with militant internationalism as the dependent variable. National chauvinism, as expected, predicts higher levels

Figure 3: Relationship between National Attachment and Cooperative Internationalism



Note: Variables are rescaled from 0 to 1. Shaded bands depict 90% confidence intervals.

of militant internationalism, but the coefficient for the interaction between the Equality Matching condition and chauvinism cannot be distinguished from 0 ($p = 0.17$). Thus, these data fail to reject the null hypothesis that the relationship between chauvinism and militant internationalism is the same whether the nation is structured according to EM or CS. Combined with the results from the hypothetical scenario, one possible explanation is that a clear and threatening situation must be evident before the relational models exert an influence.

Finally, models 6 and 7 from Table 3 show that an individual's social dominance orientation is a strong predictor of both CI and MI. Those who are high in SDO are less likely to promote international cooperation ($b = -0.447, p < 0.01$), and more likely to favor the use of the U.S. military as a tool of foreign policy ($b = 0.214, p < 0.01$). The positive relationship between SDO and MI on the one hand and negative relationship between SDO and CI on the other offers additional correlational evidence in support of the theory's main tenets: that social relations based on equality will produce lower levels of outgroup hostility and foreign policy bellicosity, while encouraging external cooperation. People who already possess this commitment to equality are more inclined to cooperate internationally, and less inclined to use force.

6 Conclusion

The connection between national identification and conflictual foreign policy has long been accepted as intuitive, something expected based on case studies of particular conflicts, that until more recently remained relatively understudied (Van Evera, 1994). While liberal nationalists tout the virtues of a strong national identity as something that builds loyalty among citizens (Kymlicka, 1998), others demonstrate a theoretical and empirical connection between strong national identities and conflict in foreign policy (Mercer, 1995; Herrmann, Isernia and Segatti, 2009; Schrock-Jacobson, 2012; Bertoli, 2014). I show, however, that these relationships are contingent, and as such there may be a viable middle ground between national identities as a cause of war and a force for peace — both inside of the country and with external states.

The results of the experiment presented here provide evidence in support of my first hypothesis, that national chauvinism positively predicts conflictual foreign policy preferences, but only when Communal Sharing norms shape the meaning of the national group and underlie the identity. The result does not hold when Equality Matching shapes the identity. I also find compelling evidence for the moderating effect of relational models in the arena of international cooperation. National attachment predicts that people will be more willing to promote the U.S. cooperating with other states and international organizations to solve global problems — but this strong, positive relationship exists only when a national identity is built upon Equality Matching norms.

The results are less clear in the case of my third hypothesis, which addresses negative perceptions of citizens in the other state in the dispute. The CS treatment predicts more negative views, compared to EM, at low levels of chauvinism, but the mean does not vary as chauvinism gets stronger while the association is clearly positive in the EM treatment group. It may be the case that an EM conception of the national identity allows for outgroup hostility, but these impressions do not seem to translate into foreign policy choices. Perhaps under EM relations, wariness of outsiders prevails absent evidence of the explicit reciprocity expected by the group members. Alternatively, because I measured these attitudes following stage 1 of the experiment, the relatively low level conflict may be obscuring relationships that would not emerge until the stakes of the conflict are raised. This can be addressed in future studies, by measuring outgroup attitudes either at the end of the conflict scenario or after every stage.

These results challenge the prevailing wisdom in international relations, by showing both that community building — the process of binding competing groups into a unified “we” — may not be as desirable as scholars expect (Wendt, 2003), but also that nationalism does not always stoke the embers of international competition as Mearsheimer (2014) fears in the case of China. The connection between a nationalistic drive for foreign policy conflict or cooperation depends on the relations that underlie the national-level social identity, a conclusion that my theoretical turn toward the relational content of identity can accommodate. Members of a unified, community-based nation can temper their outward militarism so long as levels of chauvinism remain low, but since chauvinistic nationalism is more likely to rise in the face of threats or security competition, scholars should be hesitant to place too much weight on this possibility. In contrast, those most strongly nationalistic but focused on their internal equality do not draw the same sharp distinction between their own nation and the enemy. Violence, for them, must occur only in proportion to that inflicted upon their group — which results in a more measured response to foreign policy threats. This study also has implications for policy. If the goal of nation-building has traditionally been to promote a unified community, policymakers guided by that imperative may be exacerbating the potential for interstate war in this pursuit. Promoting nationalism based on equality, however, can be a force for peace and cooperation in line with Jones’s (2014) argument in favor of an “enlightened nationalism” that generates understanding and tolerance among returning study abroad students.

At the same time that these results challenge the notion that nationalism and cooperation are incompatible, they complement the neoliberal institutionalist tradition in IR. For scholars like Axelrod (1984) and Keohane (1986), reciprocity, and not community, is the foundation for international cooperation. These scholars argue that sovereign states can cooperate by forming international institutions (Keohane, 1984), eliminating the need for a world state to bind them. While these arguments are about relations between states rather than those inside of the state, Equality Matching is the implicit relational model at work.

The results also advance work on multiculturalism and foreign policy and the distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism. For advocates of multiculturalism, true equality requires that individuals recognize and accept differences across cultural groups – and multiculturalism entails the recognition that various cultures are equally valuable (Taylor, 1994). Multiculturalism thus demands EM norms, “with all cultures having a reciprocal relationship—a healthy balance of give and

take” (Davies, Steele and Markus, 2008, 309). Davies, Steele and Markus (2008) conduct a series of experiments to show that threats to America increase support for assimilation rather than multiculturalism abroad, and the present research shows that promoting EM relations prior to threat exposure inspires foreign policy that is less reflexively bellicose.

Scholars who subscribe to the ethnic/civic dichotomy often paint ethnic nationalism in a negative light — it is “glossed as illiberal, ascriptive, particularist, and exclusive” (Brubaker, 2004, 133). Ethnic nationalism has thus already been associated with many of the same challenges that mark state level CS groups as outlined by my theory. The alternative, civic nationalism, serves as a counterpoint to the ostensibly flawed ethnic basis for national identity, characterized as “liberal, voluntarist, universalist, and inclusive” (Brubaker, 2004, 133). States that establish civic membership as key to the national identity should thus allow for a greater degree of inclusiveness and be more prone to reasonable negotiations in foreign policy in lieu of escalatory militarism (Snyder, 2000). Indeed, when Schrock-Jacobson (2012) disaggregates the two types of nationalism in her study of the effect of nationalism on interstate war initiation, their effects differ. She finds that while ethnic nationalism predicts an increased probability of war initiation, states with civic nationalism are no more likely to initiate conflict than those states where nationalism is absent. My theory can shed new light on these findings and provide a psychological foundation for the debate.

I close by pointing to two directions for future research. First, while the results of my experiment show that relational models shape the relationship between nationalism and foreign policy conflict and cooperation at the individual level, future research should explore the macro-level implications of these phenomenon. Such an investigation could exploit cross-national variation in dominant social relations to determine whether states marked by CS are more likely to escalate conflict and less likely to cooperate than those where EM relations predominate.

Second, the theory and test presented here implies a monadic view of nationalistic foreign policy preferences, similar to both recent quantitative work on nationalism and war (Schrock-Jacobson, 2012; Bertoli, 2014) and psychological evidence that perceptions of the ingroup predict the degree of external prejudice (Effron and Knowles, 2015). I manipulate social relations within the state while holding constant the description of the foreign actor and the relations between the two states. Rusborg is simply described as a neighboring state with a culture and traditions that are distinct from those of Fredonia, setting it up to be reasonably understood as an outgroup but without reference

to their norms or institutions. However, we know from past work on the democratic peace that much conflict is dyadic: democratic publics are unlikely to advocate military action against other democracies, but the same does not hold when the target is an autocracy (Tomz and Weeks, 2013). Future work could explore how the other state's dominant social relations impact the observed relationships: do strong nationalists in an EM framework escalate conflict when their opponent is a CS group, because they expect negotiations to be more difficult? A future experimental test could manipulate relational models on both sides of the dyad to answer this question.

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7 Appendix

7.1 Text of the Experimental Manipulations

Control

Imagine that you are a citizen of a country, Fredonia. Fredonia is about 297,000 square miles in area with a population of approximately 34 million people.

(On the next page)

Now, think about a meal that you enjoy. Please spend the next 3 minutes writing about this meal and how to prepare it.

Communal Sharing

Imagine that you are a citizen of a country, Fredonia. Fredonia is about 297,000 square miles in area with a population of approximately 34 million people.

In Fredonia, typical relationships among citizens are organized as follows. In the past, there were multiple cultural groups that didn't get along. Now, most individuals in your country are unified as one community and think of themselves as Fredonians – you share a common history, speak the same language, and have similar values. As a society, you generally share with one another, freely giving to others in need without expecting anything in return. When you need to make a decision for the country, you decide by reaching a consensus about what is best. You are a typical citizen of Fredonia, sharing in the cultures and traditions. You can think of your relationships with other Fredonians as you do your close family members—a group with which you share a close bond.

(On the next page)

Now, think about Fredonia's social structure as just described. Please spend the next 3 minutes writing about the benefits of Fredonian society, and how the establishment of community is optimal for the country.

Equality Matching

Imagine that you are a citizen of a country, Fredonia. Fredonia is about 297,000 square miles in area with a population of approximately 34 million people.

In Fredonia, typical relationships among citizens are organized as follows. In the past, there were multiple cultural groups that didn't get along. Now, individuals in your country recognize that you differ in many ways, but you generally think of one another as equals or peers, each with even chances. As a society, people generally keep track of what they give to one another so that they can reciprocate in the future. When you need to make a decision for the country, you do so through a voting procedure where each person gets one vote. You are a typical citizen of Fredonia, respecting the differences but equality of others. You can think of your relationships with other Fredonians as you do your casual friendships, co-workers, or classmates—a group where there is even balance and equivalent give and take.

(On the next page)

Now, think about Fredonia's social structure as just described. Please spend the next 3 minutes writing about the benefits of Fredonian society, and how the establishment of equality is optimal for the country.

7.2 Measurement Scales

National Identity

National Attachment ($\alpha = 0.804$)

1. If someone said something bad about Fredonian people, how strongly would you feel it is as if they said something bad about you?
2. How much would being an Fredonian have to do with how you feel about yourself?
3. How much do you feel that what happens to Fredonia in general would be your fate as well?

National Chauvinism ($\alpha = 0.583$)

1. How superior do you think Fredonia is compared to other nations?
2. How many things about Fredonia make you ashamed?
3. How much better would the world be if people from other countries were more like Fredonians?
4. Patriots should support Fredonia even if it is in the wrong.

Culturalism ($\alpha = 0.733$)

Some people say that the following things are important for being truly Fredonian. Others say they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is?

1. To be able to speak the dominant language.
2. To believe in the dominant religion.
3. To be born from at least one Fredonian parent.
4. To adopt the basic Fredonian culture and values as your own.

Foreign Policy Orientations

Cooperative Internationalism ($\alpha = 0.842$)

1. The United States needs to cooperate more with the United Nations.
2. It is essential for the United States to work with other nations to solve problems such as overpopulation, hunger, and pollution. In dealing with other nations our government should be understanding and flexible.
3. The best way to ensure peace is to sit down with other nations and work out our disagreements.

Militant Internationalism ($\alpha = 0.872$)

1. The United States should take all steps including the use of force to prevent aggression by any expansionist power.
2. Rather than simply countering our opponents' thrusts, it is necessary to strike at the heart of an opponent's power.
3. Going to war is unfortunate but sometimes the only solution to international problems.
4. In dealing with other nations our government should be strong and tough.
5. The United States must demonstrate its resolve so that others do not take advantage of it.

7.3 Response Options for the Conflict Vignette

How should Fredonia respond? (stage 1)/How should Fredonia respond in light of this escalation?
(stages 2 and 3)

- Welcome Rusburgians and draft an agreement to make the territory a shared space.
- Negotiate to partition the territory into Fredonian and Rusburgian portions.
- Formally announce a request that Rusburg withdraw their claim.
- Threaten economic sanctions against Rusburg to pressure them to withdraw their claim to the territory.
- Threaten the use of force in the disputed territory to pressure them to withdraw their claim.
- Break off diplomatic relations with Rusburg and begin military exercises near the territory.
- Launch a targeted strike against Rusburgian military bases.
- Declare war against Rusburg in order to fully reclaim the territory.
- Escalate the existing war by moving troops in and beginning a military takeover of the territory. (*this option only appeared in stages 2 and 3*)

7.4 Descriptive Statistics

Table 4: Mean(standard deviation)

Variable (range)	Control	Equality Matching	Communal Sharing
Stage 2 response (1-9)	3.32 (2.35)	3.53 (2.08)	3.37 (2.18)
Stage 3 response (1-9)	4.34 (2.53)	4.94 (2.51)	4.78 (2.55)
Total Escalation (-5-8)	1.91 (1.19)	2.78 (2.44)	2.81 (2.47)
Aggressive Strategy (0-1)	0.272 (0.268)	0.256 (0.231)	0.213 (0.177)
Negative View of Outgroup (0-1)	0.509 (0.212)	0.555 (0.207)	0.574 (0.179)
Cooperative internationalism (0-1)	0.702 (0.197)	0.718 (0.219)	0.665 (0.177)
Militant Internationalism (0-1)	0.577 (0.232)	0.635 (0.206)	0.649 (0.184)

7.5 Stage 1 Response

Table 5 shows the results of a logistic regression estimating the impact of the experimental conditions on the probability of choosing the least conflictual option (coded 0), or any of the more conflictual response choices. In the first model, none of the independent variables of interest have statistically significant coefficients. In the second, I add a series of control variables to see that participants with higher levels of social dominance orientation are more likely to choose one of the more conflictual response options.

Table 5: Dichotomous Stage 1 Response

	Response to Conflict at Stage 1	
	(1)	(2)
Equality Matching	0.128 (0.308)	-0.045 (0.306)
National Chauvism	0.132 (0.351)	-0.073 (0.349)
National Attachment	-0.123 (0.321)	-0.0005 (0.317)
EM x Chauvinism	-0.177 (0.478)	0.265 (0.482)
EM x Attachment	-0.121 (0.443)	-0.165 (0.435)
Age		0.0003 (0.003)
Male		-0.074 (0.071)
Bachelor's degree		0.070 (0.071)
Social Dominance Orientation		0.565*** (0.165)
Constant	0.702*** (0.238)	0.566** (0.254)
N	180	180
R ²	0.009	0.079

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Note: Main entries are logit coefficients. The reference group for Equality Matching is the Communal Sharing condition. All other variables are rescaled from 0 to 1. The dependent variable is coded 0 if the participant chose the most cooperative response option, and 1 otherwise.