Nationalisms in International Politics
Supplemental Online Appendix
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Contents

A Chapter 3 Supplemental Appendix

A.1 Separate OLS models for the Rusburg vignette

Chapter 3 uses seemingly unrelated regression to estimate responses to the crisis vignette, improving model efficiency rather than assume uncorrelated errors. Table A1 presents estimates from separate OLS models.

Table A1: Equality Moderates the Relationship between Nationalism and Conflict as Conflict Persists, Separate OLS Models

	Stage 1	Stage 2 Response	Stage 3 Response	Total Escalation
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Equality	0.166	0.164	0.323**	0.188**
	(0.237)	(0.131)	(0.156)	(0.093)
National Chauvinism	0.190	0.203	0.405**	0.272**
	(0.298)	(0.165)	(0.197)	(0.117)
Equality x Nationalism	-0.378	-0.233	-0.519^{*}	-0.323^{**}
	(0.411)	(0.228)	(0.272)	(0.162)
Constant	0.569***	0.173*	0.235**	0.443***
	(0.172)	(0.095)	(0.114)	(0.068)
N	190	190	190	190
R^2	0.006	0.013	0.027	0.030

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01
Note: Main entries are OLS coefficients. The reference group for equality is the unity
condition. All other variables are rescaled from 0 to 1.

A.2 Regression results for militant internationalism

Chapter 3 plots the relationship between content, nationalism, and militant internationalism in Figure 3.5. Table A2 displays OLS estimates, which show a statistically significant negative interaction between equality and naitonalism.

Table A2: Nationalism, Equality, and Militant Internationalism

	Militant Internationalism
	(1)
Equality	0.206**
	(0.099)
Nationalism	0.283**
	(0.124)
Equality x Nationalism	−0.396**
	(0.171)
Constant	0.481***
	(0.072)
N	190
R^2	0.033

$^*p < .1; ^{**}p < .05; ^{***}p < .01$
Note: Main entries are OLS coefficients. The reference group for Equality is the Unity condition. All other variables are rescaled from 0 to 1.

A.3 Results robust to using factor scores for nationalism

Table A3 replicates the models from chapter 3, replacing the additive scale for nationalism with factor scores. The results are robust to this alternative coding of nationalism.

Table A3: Equality moderates the relationship between nationalism and conflict using factor score measurement

	Stage 1 Response (1)	Stage 2 Response (2)	Stage 3 Response (3)	Total Escalation (4)	Militant Internationalism (5)
Equality	0.241	0.264**	0.337**	0.172**	0.178*
	(0.219)	(0.121)	(0.145)	(0.086)	(0.091)
Nationalism	0.171	0.243*	0.330**	0.208**	0.231**
	(0.238)	(0.131)	(0.157)	(0.094)	(0.099)
Equality x Nationalism	−0.445	−0.361**	−0.474**	−0.256**	−0.302**
	(0.326)	(0.180)	(0.216)	(0.129)	(0.136)
Constant	0.565***	0.132	0.251**	0.462***	0.492***
	(0.158)	(0.087)	(0.104)	(0.062)	(0.066)
N	190	190	190	190	190
R^2	0.013	0.027	0.031	0.028	0.032

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01
Note: Main entries are OLS coefficients. The reference group for Equality is the Unity condition. All other variables are rescaled from 0 to 1.

A.4 Comparing unity and equality to pure control

Table A4 displays estimates from 5 OLS models that incorporate the content-free control condition from the Fredonia experiment. The results suggest that equality treatment reduces nationalism's conflictual effect vis-à-vis the control condition for the stage 2 response, stage 3 response, and militant internationalism, but not for the total escalation variable. The results suggest a negative but weaker interaction between unity and nationalism on militant internationalism compared to the pure control. These findings underscore equality's mitigating effect on nationalist militarism, but should be interpreted in light of the difficulty in comparing unity and equality to a participants who receive no information about identity content. The control group likely features substantial heterogeneity in ideas about content and, as discussed in chapter 3, lower nationalism levels in the pure control complicate comparisons.

Table A4: Equality moderates relationship between nationalism and conflict relative to content-free control

	Stage 1 (1)	Stage 2 (2)	Stage 3 (3)	Total Escalation (4)	Militant Internationalism (5)
Equality	0.158	0.276**	0.394***	0.131*	0.351***
	(0.197)	(0.112)	(0.128)	(0.075)	(0.084)
Unity	−0.008	0.112	0.070	−0.058	0.145*
	(0.205)	(0.116)	(0.133)	(0.078)	(0.087)
National Chauvinism	0.239	0.555***	0.613***	0.075	0.583***
	(0.250)	(0.142)	(0.163)	(0.095)	(0.106)
Equality x Nationalism	−0.428	−0.584***	−0.727***	−0.126	−0.696***
	(0.377)	(0.214)	(0.245)	(0.144)	(0.160)
Unity x Nationalism	−0.050	−0.352	−0.208	0.197	−0.300*
	(0.387)	(0.220)	(0.252)	(0.148)	(0.165)
Constant	0.577***	0.061	0.165**	0.500***	0.336***
	(0.113)	(0.064)	(0.073)	(0.043)	(0.048)
N	301	301	301	301	301
R^2	0.008	0.057	0.070	0.052	0.123

*$p < .1$; **$p < .05$; ***$p < .01$
Note: Main entries are OLS coefficients. The control group is the reference category. All other variables are rescaled from 0 to 1.

A.5 Controlling for prior choices in the Rusburg vignette

Table A5 presents OLS estimates for stages 2 and 3 of the conflict vignette, but add an additional control for participant responses during the prior stage. The system includes a model for the stage 1 response, which is identical to the stage 1 results from chapter 3. As I report in the book, the results largely comport with my main findings, though the p-value on the interaction coefficient for stage 3 increases ($p = 0.095$). Including total escalation in the seemingly unrelated regression produces nearly identical results, and the negative coefficient on the interaction between nationalism and equality for total escalation remains statistically significant ($p = 0.043$).

Table A5: Controlling for response in previous stage

	Stage 2	Stage 3
	(1)	(2))
Equality	0.148	0.196
	(0.110)	(0.117)
Nationalism	0.239	0.248
	(0.138)	(0.147)
Equality x Nationalism	-0.239	-0.339^{*}
	(0.190)	(0.201)
Stage 1 Response	0.833^{***}	
	(0.091)	
Stage 2 Response		0.773^{***}
		(0.065)
Constant	0.039	0.101
	(0.081)	(0.085)
N	190	190
R^2	0.296	0.448

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01
Note: Main entries are OLS coefficients from a seemingly unrelated regression; the system also includes the stage 1 response. The reference group for equality is the unity condition. All other variables are rescaled from 0 to 1.

A.6 Regression results for placebo tests

Tables A6 and A7 present results from the series of placebo tests discussed in Chapter 3 and Figure 3 from the printed appendix. The results show no evidence for consistent interactions between equality and attachment, knowledge, party identification, or ideology.

Table A6: Placebo tests using attachment and knowledge

	Stage 2	Stage 3	Escalation	MI	Stage 2	Stage	Escalation	MI
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Equality	0.157	0.111	0.020	0.142	0.014	0.0001	0.017	−0.003
	(0.153)	(0.185)	(0.110)	(0.115)	(0.068)	(0.082)	(0.049)	(0.052)
Attachment	0.182	0.086	0.060	0.277**				
	(0.154)	(0.186)	(0.111)	(0.116)				
Equality x Attachment	−0.160	−0.101	−0.007	−0.195				
	(0.211)	(0.254)	(0.152)	(0.158)				
Knowledge					0.015	−0.066	−0.033	0.008
					(0.086)	(0.103)	(0.062)	(0.065)
Equality x Knowledge					0.046	0.080	−0.016	−0.021
					(0.122)	(0.147)	(0.088)	(0.093)
Constant	0.149	0.395***	0.548***	0.430***	0.279***	0.490***	0.609***	0.634***
	(0.119)	(0.143)	(0.085)	(0.089)	(0.048)	(0.058)	(0.035)	(0.037)
N	190	190	190	190	190	190	190	190
R²	0.012	0.005	0.004	0.034	0.007	0.006	0.006	0.001

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Note: Main entries are OLS coefficients. Unity is the reference group for Equality. Continuous variables rescaled from 0 to 1.

Table A7: Placebo tests using ideology and partisanship

	Stage 2	Stage 3	Escalation	MI	Stage 2	Stage	Escalation	MI
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Equality	0.168*	0.099	−0.011	0.050	0.133	0.006	−0.066	0.043
	(0.086)	(0.105)	(0.063)	(0.062)	(0.086)	(0.105)	(0.063)	(0.063)
Ideology	−0.040	−0.062	−0.030	−0.224***				
	(0.099)	(0.120)	(0.072)	(0.071)				
Equality x Ideology	−0.211	−0.093	0.038	−0.073				
	(0.136)	(0.166)	(0.100)	(0.099)				
Party Id					−0.096	−0.177	−0.096	−0.219***
					(0.102)	(0.124)	(0.074)	(0.074)
Equality x Party Id					−0.155	0.073	0.142	−0.070
					(0.141)	(0.172)	(0.103)	(0.103)
Constant	0.307***	0.492***	0.609***	0.756***	0.335***	0.550***	0.643***	0.751***
	(0.059)	(0.071)	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.059)	(0.072)	(0.043)	(0.043)
N	190	190	190	190	190	190	190	190
R^2	0.042	0.014	0.002	0.135	0.043	0.018	0.012	0.121

* $p < .1$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$
Note: Main entries are OLS coefficients. Unity is the reference group for Equality. Continuous variables rescaled from 0 to 1.

A.7 Nationalisms do not influence perceptions of Rusburg before escalation

The study asked participants to report views of Rusburg and their preferred strategy after reporting policy preferences during stage 1 as part of the broader study. Consistent with the muted responses at low conflict levels, nationalisms do not affect these intermediate assessments.

Table A8: No relationship between nationalisms and stage 1 attitudes

	Negative Views	Aggressive strategies
	(1)	(2)
Equality	−0.140	0.071
	(0.098)	(0.100)
National Chauvinism	0.028	−0.187
	(0.123)	(0.126)
Equality x Nationalism	0.253	−0.046
	(0.170)	(0.174)
Constant	0.541***	0.312***
	(0.071)	(0.073)
N	190	190
R^2	0.030	0.044

$^*p < .1$; $^{**}p < .05$; $^{***}p < .01$
Note: Main entries are OLS coefficients. The reference group for equality is the unity condition. All other variables are rescaled from 0 to 1.

B   Chapter 4 Supplemental Appendix

B.1   Modeling nationalisms

Table B1 presents results from an OLS mdoel that regresses the nationalism scores on a panel of demographic covariates — sex, age, race, education, income, political knowledge, and partisanship — and the interactions between each variable and treatment assignment. Per chapter 4, "the results reveal remarkable similarity" in the demographic predictors of nationalism scores. The results suggest little evidence that individual traits moderate the relationship between the treatments and nationalism — which remains evenly distributed across groups. Removing party identification from the models produces no meaningful changes.

Table B1: Who are the nationalists?

	Nationalism
Male	0.001 (0.033)
Age: 25-34	−0.032 (0.063)
Age: 35-44	0.079 (0.064)
Age: 45-54	0.092 (0.066)
Age: 55-64	0.118* (0.065)
Age: 65 and older	0.034 (0.067)
White	−0.047 (0.038)
Some College	−0.012 (0.043)
2/4 year degree	0.017 (0.040)
Professional Degree/Doctorate	−0.065 (0.055)
Income: 2nd quartile	−0.003 (0.046)
Income: 3rd quartile	−0.019 (0.047)
Income: 4th quartile	−0.003 (0.047)
Political Knowledge	0.003 (0.032)
Party Identification (Republican)	0.170*** (0.049)
Equality	0.055 (0.091)
Unity	−0.002 (0.095)
Male x Equality	−0.009 (0.050)
Male x Unity	0.015 (0.049)
Age: 25-34 x Equality	−0.038 (0.091)
Age: 25-34 x Unity	0.125 (0.094)
Age: 35-44 x Equality	−0.169* (0.092)
Age: 35-44 x Unity	0.044 (0.096)
Age: 45-54 x Equality	−0.116 (0.092)
Age: 45-54 x Unity	0.129 (0.099)
Age: 55-64 x Equality	−0.170* (0.094)
Age: 55-64 x Unity	0.006 (0.100)
Age: 65 and older x Equality	−0.071 (0.094)
Age: 65 and older x Unity	0.085 (0.102)
White x Equality	0.070 (0.055)
White x Unity	−0.114* (0.058)
Some College x Equality	−0.029 (0.066)
Some College x Unity	−0.030 (0.065)
College/University x Equality	−0.031 (0.063)
College/University x Unity	−0.059 (0.059)
Grad/Prof Degree x Equality	0.040 (0.084)
Grad/Prof Degree x Unity	−0.050 (0.091)
Income: 2nd quartile x Equality	−0.001 (0.066)
Income: 2nd quartile x Unity	−0.001 (0.065)
Income: 3rd quartile x Equality	0.048 (0.066)
Income: 3rd quartile x Unity	0.027 (0.068)
Income: 4th quartile x Equality	0.060 (0.068)
Income: 4th quartile x Unity	0.019 (0.070)
Political Knowledge x Equality	−0.062 (0.047)
Political Knowledge x Unity	−0.003 (0.047)
Party Identification (Republican) x Equality	−0.032 (0.070)
Party Identification (Republican) x Unity	0.038 (0.072)
Constant	0.455*** (0.062)
N	631
R^2	0.128

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

B.2 Regression results for separate ISIS items

Chapter 4 presents a coefficient plot that depicts OLS estimates from models that regress support for the separate ISIS policies on the treatments, nationalism, and the interactions. Table B2 presents these regression results in tabular form. Members of the public generally want to take action against ISIS — looking at the intercept in Models 1-4, I find that the average respondent in the sample at least somewhat supports airstrikes, drone strikes against militants, and a potential no-fly zone in Syria. Moreover, results from model 1 show that participants broadly opposed negotiating with this adversary. The absence of statistically significant coefficents in Model 1 reflects the limited variation on this dependent variable. Only a small portion of the sample supported negotiating with ISIS to resolve their territorial claims — 57.6% of participants selected that they at least "somewhat oppose" negotiation.

Table B2: Unity-oriented Nationalism Increases Support for Ground Troops

	Do Not Negotiate (1)	Airstrikes (2)	Drones (3)	No-Fly Zone (4)	Ground Troops (5)
Equality	−0.003	−0.054	−0.021	−0.033	−0.015
	(0.078)	(0.061)	(0.063)	(0.058)	(0.072)
Unity	−0.066	−0.067	−0.102	−0.053	−0.150**
	(0.078)	(0.061)	(0.063)	(0.059)	(0.072)
Nationalism	0.004	0.277***	0.250***	0.216***	0.303***
	(0.087)	(0.068)	(0.070)	(0.065)	(0.080)
Equality x Nationalism	−0.132	0.020	−0.047	0.006	0.092
	(0.135)	(0.106)	(0.108)	(0.101)	(0.125)
Unity x Nationalism	−0.026	0.038	0.110	0.027	0.270**
	(0.132)	(0.103)	(0.106)	(0.099)	(0.122)
Constant	0.711***	0.629***	0.655***	0.616***	0.376***
	(0.052)	(0.041)	(0.042)	(0.039)	(0.048)
N	632	632	632	632	632
R^2	0.016	0.078	0.067	0.051	0.103

*$p < .1$; **$p < .05$; ***$p < .01$
Note: Main entries are OLS coefficients. The reference group is the control condition. Continuous variables are rescaled from 0 to 1.

B.3 Demographic Controls

Table B3 replicates the primary analyses in chapter 4 while adjusting for a panel of additional covariates — sex, age, race, education, income, and political knowledge. The results confirm the statistically significant negative interactions between nationalism and equality on militant internationalism ($p = 0.068$) and China postures ($p = 0.072$). They also suggest interesting demographic variation. Men promote more aggression against ISIS and China compared to women (Eichenberg and Stoll, 2012; Lizotte, 2019), and higher scores on the political knowledge scale correspond to increases on militant internationalism, being tough on China, and conflict with ISIS.

Table B3: Models with additional controls

	Militant Internationalism (1)	ISIS (2)	China (3)	Russia (4)
Equality	0.063	−0.028	0.056	0.067
	(0.038)	(0.047)	(0.050)	(0.048)
Unity	−0.008	−0.095**	0.010	0.008
	(0.038)	(0.047)	(0.050)	(0.048)
Nationalism	0.326***	0.249***	0.362***	0.273***
	(0.043)	(0.053)	(0.056)	(0.054)
Equality x Nationalism	−0.122*	0.021	−0.157*	−0.092
	(0.067)	(0.082)	(0.087)	(0.084)
Unity x Nationalism	0.016	0.127	−0.058	0.005
	(0.065)	(0.080)	(0.085)	(0.081)
Male	0.012	0.037**	0.056***	0.026
	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.017)
Age: 25-34	−0.004	−0.021	0.032	−0.021
	(0.026)	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.032)
Age: 35-44	−0.024	−0.029	0.029	−0.039
	(0.027)	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.033)
Age:45-54	0.033	0.034	0.070**	−0.008
	(0.027)	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.034)
Age:55-64	0.019	0.018	0.069*	0.008
	(0.028)	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.035)
Age: 65+	0.021	0.052	0.114***	0.051
	(0.027)	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.034)
White	−0.017	0.041**	−0.017	−0.045**
	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.019)
Some College	0.025	0.016	0.015	−0.004
	(0.019)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.023)
College/University	−0.017	−0.015	0.007	0.023
	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.022)
Grad/Prof Degree	−0.038	0.014	−0.015	0.030
	(0.025)	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.031)
Income: $25-49,999	0.027	0.015	0.065***	0.031
	(0.018)	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.023)
Income: $50-74,999	0.015	0.047**	0.039	0.043*
	(0.019)	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.023)
Income: $75,000 +	0.027	0.027	0.057**	0.010
	(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.024)
Political Knowledge	0.056**	0.072**	0.102***	0.006
	(0.023)	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.029)
Constant	0.491***	0.476***	0.376***	0.346***
	(0.035)	(0.043)	(0.046)	(0.044)
N	631	631	631	631
R^2	0.215	0.191	0.198	0.125

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01
Note: Main entries are OLS coefficients. The reference group is the control condition. Continuous variables rescaled from 0 to 1.

B.4 Placebo Tests

Table B4 presents results from the series of placebo tests described in Chapter 4. These models regress militant internationalism and China postures on the treatment assignment and, in turn: national attachment, party identification, ideology, and interaction terms. If an unmeasured factor confounds scores on the nationalism scale, for example, it should manifest in other measures similar to nationalism, like attachment, or in political dispositions.

The results reveal little evidence to support concerns that the nationalism scale taps compliance or other related constructs. I find non-significant interaction coefficients in 5 of 6 significance tests, increasing my confidence that the the results I report in chapter 4 depend on the interaction between the treatments and nationalism. Table B5 estimates the same models for the ISIS and Russia scales and finds no evidence for placebo interactions.

Table B4: Placebo tests for MI and China using national attachment, party identification, and ideology

	Militant Internationalism			China		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Equality	0.010	−0.005	0.004	−0.035	−0.025	0.016
	(0.046)	(0.029)	(0.036)	(0.060)	(0.037)	(0.048)
Unity	−0.013	0.006	0.038	−0.051	−0.004	0.076*
	(0.048)	(0.028)	(0.034)	(0.062)	(0.037)	(0.045)
National Attachment	0.277***			0.323***		
	(0.046)			(0.059)		
Equality x Attachment	−0.028			−0.001		
	(0.067)			(0.087)		
Unity x Attachment	0.008			0.026		
	(0.068)			(0.089)		
Party Identification		0.124***			0.122***	
		(0.033)			(0.043)	
Equality x Party ID		−0.029			−0.047	
		(0.048)			(0.063)	
Unity x Party ID		−0.029			−0.062	
		(0.049)			(0.064)	
Ideology			0.231***			0.248***
			(0.037)			(0.049)
Equality x Ideology			−0.043			−0.119
			(0.059)			(0.078)
Unity x Ideology			−0.083			−0.203***
			(0.056)			(0.074)
Constant	0.524***	0.648***	0.583***	0.517***	0.673***	0.597***
	(0.032)	(0.019)	(0.023)	(0.041)	(0.025)	(0.030)
N	632	632	632	632	632	632
R^2	0.131	0.045	0.099	0.123	0.027	0.054

$^*p < .1$; $^{**}p < .05$; $^{***}p < .01$

Note: Main entries are OLS coefficients. The reference group is the control condition. Continuous variables rescaled from 0 to 1.

Table B5: No Evidence for Placebo Interactions on ISIS and Russia Attitudes

	ISIS			Russia		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Equality	−0.055	−0.014	0.012	−0.035	−0.010	−0.011
	(0.058)	(0.035)	(0.044)	(0.057)	(0.034)	(0.044)
Unity	−0.111*	−0.020	−0.025	−0.022	0.027	0.030
	(0.061)	(0.034)	(0.041)	(0.060)	(0.034)	(0.042)
National Attachment	0.137**			0.120**		
	(0.058)			(0.057)		
Equality x Attachment	0.047			0.082		
	(0.085)			(0.084)		
Unity x Attachment	0.113			0.041		
	(0.087)			(0.086)		
Party Identification		0.132***			0.014	
		(0.040)			(0.040)	
Equality x Party ID		−0.040			0.045	
		(0.059)			(0.059)	
Unity x Party ID		−0.035			−0.044	
		(0.060)			(0.059)	
Ideology			0.226***			0.094**
			(0.046)			(0.046)
Equality x Ideology			−0.083			0.039
			(0.072)			(0.073)
Unity x Ideology			−0.020			−0.045
			(0.068)			(0.069)
Constant	0.622***	0.651***	0.592***	0.433***	0.506***	0.462***
	(0.040)	(0.023)	(0.028)	(0.040)	(0.023)	(0.028)
N	632	632	632	632	632	632
R^2	0.050	0.037	0.076	0.034	0.005	0.017

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

B.5 Noncompliance

The American nationalisms experiment entails a multi-step task designed to manipulate content. Yet participants might not comply with the manipulation if they have strong existing ideas about what constitutes American nationalism or simply fail to engage the task. These dynamics

could produce something analogous to treatment non-compliance (Angrist, Imbens and Rubin, 1996), whereby some participants refuse to take up the prompt and others defy it. As Gerber et al. (2010, 298) summarize, noncompliance poses a problem insofar as "the treatment to which subjects were randomly assigned may differ from the treatment that subjects actually receive."

In political science, we typically discuss noncompliance in the context of field experiments — like a participant who fails to to retrieve their mail and therefore does not receive a postcard prompting them to vote (Gerber et al., 2010) — or when specific behavioral outcomes indicate compliance (Horiuchi, Imai and Taniguchi, 2007). Insofar as compliance refers to whether a participant takes up a treatment when they receive instructions, however, we can apply the idea to survey experiments where the treatment itself involves reading and writing about key concepts[1] — a common approach in political psychology. For example, experiments that manipulate emotions often include an open-ended thought-listing activity (Albertson and Gadarian, 2016), but experimenters cannot control what the participant ultimately chooses to write about.

The results in chapter 4 results therefore represent "intent-to-treat" effects — the difference between the treatment and control among participants exposed to the equality or unity treatment. The ITT provides an unbiased estimate of a true treatment effect, but underestimates the magnitude of effects with widespread noncompliance.

One approach entails restricting the sample to people who complied with the treatment, and I find consistent results adopting this approach in chapter 4. Estimating complier average causal effects (CACEs) using an instrumental variable regression approach offers a more rigorous way to estimate treatment effects among participants who engaged with the task.

To estimate CACEs, a research assistant first coded noncompliance using responses to the

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[1]See also Kertzer, 2016 on attention as compliance indicator.

open-ended listing task. They categorized each item, coding the statement 1 for a statement that responds to the treatment prompt and 0 if the text a) reflects refusal to engage with the task, such as a random letter string or "NA" entry, or b) included a participant statement that they disagreed with the premise. For example, two participants wrote "I don't" or "This is not the true face of America."

Next, I evaluate the CACEs using two thresholds for compliance: the low threshold treats anyone who generated at least one entry consistent with the prompt as a complier, and the more conservative high threshold requires at least two entries. The low threshold classifies 15.34 and 15.08% of the sample as noncompliers in the unity and equality groups, respectively, and the high threshold categorizes 21.47 and 24% of each group as noncompliers.

The grey points in Figure B1 display results from instrumental variable regression analyses that use random assignment as the instrument. Light grey points depict the CACE using a high threshold for compliance, whereas darker grey depict estimates using the low threshold for compliance. Black points show the ITT estimates for comparison. As expected, the CACE estimates are slightly larger compared to ITT estimates. Importantly, the direction and statistical significance of the effects remains similar across all 3 estimates. Of course, challenges to operationalizing compliance in a survey experiment and to estimating CACEs in cases of partial compliance — when some participants take up part of the treatment, like reading the vignette but not listing thoughts — suggest caution in interpreting these results.

a) Equality

b) Unity

Legend (panel a):
- Low Nationalism (▲, dashed)
- High Nationalism (●, solid)

Legend (panel b):
- ITT (■ black)
- Low Threshold CACE (■ gray)
- High Threshold CACE (□ light gray)

Y-axis categories: Tough on China, Militant Internationalism

X-axis: Treatment Effect (−0.2, −0.1, 0.0, 0.1, 0.2)

Note: Point estimates in black represent the intent to treat estimates, not accounting for compliance. Point estimates represent the complier average causal effect at high (N=229) and low (N=207) levels of nationalism, based on instrumental variable regression results where treatment assignment is the instrument in the first stage. Variables are rescaled from 0 to 1. Horizontal bands depict 90% confidence intervals.

B.6 Controlling for flag exposure

To account for the possibility that increased salience might affect nationalist commitments, the survey randomly assigned some participants to see a small clipart image of an American flag prior to completing the policy questionnaire. Results in Table B6 confirm that exposure to the flag image did not affect nationalism (model 1) nor moderate the effects of the treatments on nationalism (model 2).

Table B6: Flag exposure does not affect nationalism

	Nationalism	
	(1)	(2)
Flag	0.019	0.046
	(0.018)	(0.029)
Equality		−0.001
		(0.031)
Unity		0.010
		(0.032)
Flag x Equality		−0.055
		(0.044)
Flag x Unity		−0.034
		(0.044)
Constant	0.529***	0.526***
	(0.013)	(0.021)
N	632	632
R^2	0.002	0.007

$^{*}p < .1;$ $^{**}p < .05;$ $^{***}p < .01$

Tables B7 and B8 include flag exposure as a control variable in the OLS models to further account for any variation in the dependent variables that may be explained by the image. Models 1, 3, 5, and 7 in Table B7 regress the dependent variable on equality, unity, nationalism, the interactions, and a dummy indicator for the flag. Models 2, 4, 6, and 8 include the panel of demographic controls. The results show that accounting for the American flag exposure produces

nearly identical estimates to the pooled models — for example, the coefficient on the interaction between equality and nationalism in is 3 one-thousandths larger in Model 1 compared to the pooled model in chapter 4 ($b = -0.145$ compared to $b = -0.142$). Table B8 presents the results for the disaggregated ISIS scale, again displaying remarkable similarity to the pooled models. These results further confirm that national identity salience does not account for the findings — instead, the combination of content and commitment plays an important role in foreign policy attitudes.

Table B7: Models controlling for flag exposure

	Militant Internationalism		China		ISIS		Russia	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Equality	0.070*	0.065*	0.070	0.056	−0.031	−0.028	0.066	0.068
	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.048)
Unity	−0.009	−0.007	0.013	0.011	−0.093*	−0.095**	−0.0004	0.009
	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.052)	(0.050)	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.048)
Nationalism	0.344***	0.329***	0.388***	0.362***	0.262***	0.250***	0.268***	0.276***
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.057)	(0.056)	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.054)	(0.054)
Equality x Nationalism	−0.145**	−0.126*	−0.199**	−0.158*	0.018	0.019	−0.086	−0.095
	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.089)	(0.087)	(0.083)	(0.082)	(0.083)	(0.084)
Unity x Nationalism	0.010	0.014	−0.078	−0.059	0.111	0.127	0.015	0.004
	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.087)	(0.085)	(0.081)	(0.080)	(0.081)	(0.081)
Flag	−0.013	−0.013	0.001	−0.003	−0.0002	−0.005	−0.011	−0.013
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.015)
Controls		✓		✓		✓		✓
Constant	0.524***	0.496***	0.516***	0.377***	0.569***	0.478***	0.371***	0.351***
	(0.026)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.046)	(0.033)	(0.043)	(0.033)	(0.044)
N	632	631	632	631	632	631	632	631
R^2	0.176	0.216	0.115	0.198	0.119	0.191	0.081	0.126

$^*p < .1$; $^{**}p < .05$; $^{***}p < .01$

Table B8: Flag exposure and support for ground troops to fight ISIS

	Do Not Negotiate	Airstrikes	Drones	No-Fly Zone	Ground Troops	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Equality	−0.002	−0.055	−0.021	−0.033	−0.015	0.007
	(0.078)	(0.061)	(0.063)	(0.059)	(0.072)	(0.073)
Unity	−0.065	−0.068	−0.101	−0.053	−0.150**	−0.148**
	(0.078)	(0.061)	(0.063)	(0.059)	(0.072)	(0.072)
Nationalism	0.006	0.276***	0.251***	0.217***	0.303***	0.314***
	(0.087)	(0.068)	(0.070)	(0.065)	(0.080)	(0.081)
Flag	−0.010	0.005	−0.005	−0.003	0.001	−0.003
	(0.025)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Equality x Nationalism	−0.135	0.022	−0.049	0.005	0.092	0.050
	(0.135)	(0.106)	(0.108)	(0.101)	(0.125)	(0.126)
Unity x Nationalism	−0.027	0.039	0.110	0.026	0.270**	0.261**
	(0.132)	(0.103)	(0.106)	(0.099)	(0.122)	(0.122)
Controls						✓
Constant	0.715***	0.627***	0.657***	0.617***	0.375***	0.440***
	(0.053)	(0.041)	(0.042)	(0.040)	(0.049)	(0.067)
N	632	632	632	632	632	631
R^2	0.016	0.078	0.067	0.051	0.103	0.131
Adjusted R^2	0.007	0.069	0.058	0.042	0.094	0.103

*$p < .1$; **$p < .05$; ***$p < .01$

B.7 Marginal effects plots for Russia and ISIS

Figure B2 displays marginal effects plots for the Russia and ISIS dependent variables. The OLS results showed no evidence for linear interactions between either unity or equality and nationalism and these outcomes. The marginal effects plots bear this out, with the notable exception that the marginal effect of unity has a negative value at the low end of the nationalism scale for the ISIS outcome. Per the discussion in chapter 4, this pattern is likely driven by the difference that emerges between unity and equality on support for sending ground troops to fight ISIS, one item on the additive scale.

Figure B2: Russia and ISIS Marginal Effects

C   Chapter 5 Supplemental Appendix

C.1   IntUne Mass Surveys

C.1.1   Cross-national descriptive statistics for trust and support for foreign policy cooperation

Participants responded to the following prompt: "Please tell me on a scale of 0 to 10, how much you personally trust each of the following groups of people. '0' means that you do not trust the group at all and '10' means you have complete trust." Several target groups followed this statement: co-nationals (e.g., Germans), "*People in other European countries*" (the dependent variable in these analyses), and "People outside Europe." Questions about trust in institutions immediately preceded these questions, questions about whether political decision-makers adequately account for people's interests followed.[2]

Figure C1: European trust by country

Note: Bars depict the mean (with 95% confidence interval) for trust in other Europeans, pooled across the two survey waves and adjusting for population weights. The variable has been rescaled to range from 0 to 1, and higher values indicate greater trust. Dashed line indicates the overall sample mean.

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[2]Cotta, Isernia and Bellucci (2009).   Codebooks for mass public data available on ICPSR: https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR34421.v1 and https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR34272.v2.

The next two dependent variables — support for the common foreign and security policy and providing economic and social support to fellow EU countries — followed the same prompt (relevant items italicized): "Thinking about the European Union over the next ten years or so, can you tell me whether you are in favour or against the following." Respondents indicated, on a scale from "strongly in favour" to "strongly against," whether they support or oppose "A unified tax system for the EU," "A common system of social security in the EU," "*A single EU foreign policy toward outside countries*," and "*More help for EU regions in economic or social difficulties*." Participants viewed these target items in random order. The question was preceded by a series of items asking about whether certain policies should be the responsibility of national governments or the EU, and succeeded by the question asking about a European army. Figure C2 displays average CFSP support, and Figure C3 displays average economic and social support.

Figure C2: Common foreign policy support by country

Note: Bars depict mean (with 95% confidence interval) common foreign policy favorability, pooled across the two survey waves adjusting for population weights. The variable has been rescaled to range from 0 to 1, and higher values indicate greater favorability. Dashed line indicates the overall sample mean.

Finally, respondents answered the following prompt: "Some say that we should have a single

Figure C3: European economic and social support by country

Note: Bars depict mean (with 95% confidence interval) favorability for economic and social support, pooled across the two survey waves adjusting for population weights. The variable has been rescaled to range from 0 to 1, and higher values indicate greater favorability. Dashed line indicates the overall sample mean.

European Union Army. Others say every country should keep its own national army. What is your opinion?": national armies, European army, both national and European, and "neither nor." I removed participants who chose "no army" for analysis, though the results are unaffected by accounting for this category (see §C.1.6).

Figure C4: Support for a European army by country

Note: Bars depict the percentage of people who support a national army only, a European army only, or both a national and European army, by country, pooled across the 2007 and 2009 survey waves and incorporating population weights.

C.1.2 Regression table: Trust and CFSP support

Table C1 displays results from the OLS models used to generate figures in chapter 5. Models 3, 4, 7, and 8 in Table C1 include coefficients for the interaction between unity or equality and European identification.Consistent with results I report in chapter 5, I find no evidence for statistically significant linear interactions between unity or equality and European identification.

Table C1: Equality associated with support for European trust and foreign policy cooperation

	Trust Other Europeans					Favor EU Foreign Policy		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Unity	-0.110^{**}	-0.078^{**}	-0.089^{**}	-0.077^{**}	-0.118^{**}	-0.093^{**}	-0.098^{**}	-0.093^{**}
	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.015)	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.022)	(0.016)
Equality	0.314^{**}	0.223^{**}	0.224^{**}	0.230^{**}	0.451^{**}	0.384^{**}	0.385^{**}	0.383^{**}
	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.033)	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.045)
National Attachment		0.050^{**}	0.050^{**}	0.050^{**}		-0.004	-0.004	-0.004
		(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)		(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Eur. Identification		0.055^{**}	0.042^{*}	0.068^{**}		0.077^{**}	0.071^{*}	0.075^{*}
		(0.010)	(0.018)	(0.020)		(0.020)	(0.034)	(0.031)
Generalized Trust		0.276^{**}	0.276^{**}	0.276^{**}		0.058^{**}	0.058^{**}	0.058^{**}
		(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)		(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Other EU Visits		0.025	0.025	0.025		0.045^{**}	0.045^{**}	0.045^{**}
		(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)		(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Ideology (right)		0.004	0.004	0.004		-0.046^{**}	-0.046^{**}	-0.046^{**}
		(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)		(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Male		0.011^{**}	0.011^{**}	0.011^{**}		0.059^{**}	0.059^{**}	0.059^{**}
		(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)		(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
University		0.026^{**}	0.026^{**}	0.026^{**}		0.051^{**}	0.051^{**}	0.051^{**}
		(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)		(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Unity x Eur. Id.			0.023				0.012	
			(0.021)				(0.031)	
Equality x Eur. Id.				-0.018				0.003
				(0.021)				(0.033)
Age dummies		✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
Country & Year fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Constant	0.378^{**}	0.186^{**}	0.191^{**}	0.181^{**}	0.394^{**}	0.335^{**}	0.337^{**}	0.335^{**}
	(0.008)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.022)
N	31,363	29,877	29,877	29,877	31,409	29,919	29,919	29,919
R^2	0.065	0.198	0.198	0.198	0.110	0.141	0.141	0.141

$^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$

Note: Models report OLS coefficients with standard errors clustered by country. The dependent variable and continuous independent variables have been rescaled from 0 to 1. All models incorporate population weights and include country and survey year fixed effects; Models 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, and 8 include Age dummies suppressed for presentation. Reference categories are France and 65 years and older.

C.1.3 *Results robust to dropping plausibly post-treatment controls*

Table C2: Results Robust to Dropping Ideology and EU Travel

	Trust Other Europeans	Favor EU Foreign Policy
	(1)	(2)
Unity	-0.079^{**}	-0.103^{**}
	(0.007)	(0.007)
Equality	0.226^{**}	0.392^{**}
	(0.018)	(0.018)
National Attachment	0.049^{**}	-0.009
	(0.007)	(0.008)
Eur. Identification	0.057^{**}	0.081^{**}
	(0.010)	(0.010)
Generalized Trust	0.277^{**}	0.062^{**}
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Male	0.012	0.062^{**}
	(0.004)	(0.004)
University	0.029^{**}	0.054^{**}
	(0.006)	(0.006)
Constant	0.190^{**}	0.318^{**}
	(0.020)	(0.019)
Age dummies	✓	✓
Country & Year fixed effects	✓	✓
N	30,932	30,979
R^2	0.196	0.137

$^*p < .05;\ ^{**}p < .01$
Note: OLS coefficients with standard errors clustered by country. The dependent variable and continuous independent variables have been rescaled from 0 to 1. All models incorporate population weights and include country and survey year fixed effects, and include age dummies suppressed for space. Reference categories are France and 65 years and older.

Chapter 5 discusses theoretically relevant control variables, and presents my rationale for including ideology and intra-European travel to guard against concerning omitted variable bias. Yet these variables may introduce post-treatment bias if unity and equality affect ideology or propensity to travel. Existing work offers competing expectations regarding whether these items follow from or precede supranational commitments. Lacking experimental or panel data that could adjudicate a causal relationship, I include both controls in the primary analyses and drop

them from the models as a robustness test here.

Table C2 replicates the results for trust and CFSP support from chapter 5 but excludes ideology and EU travel. Removing these variables has no substantive effect on key coefficients — the coefficient on equality remains positive and significant, whereas the coefficient on unity remains negative and significant. Wald tests further suggest that including ideology and EU travel significantly improves the model fit for both trust ($X^2 = 34.21$, $p < 0.01$) and support for the CFSP ($X^2 = 73.80$, $p < 0.01$).

C.1.4   *Results robust to using 3-factor solution*

The analyses in chapter 4 use factor scores from a factor analysis on all eight identity content items to create independent variables that measure unity and equality. Although a 3-factor solution marginally improves model fit, the third factor would contain only a single strongly loading item (to be Christian). Theory and a model selection perspective favor the 2-factor solution, considering tradeoffs between simplicity, fit, and interpretation (Preacher et al., 2013).

I nevertheless evaluate whether my findings are robust to using factor scores 3-factor model, effectively excluding "to be Christian" from the unity scale. I retained factor scores from the first two factors of the three-factor solution and estimated the primary models with these variables. I present the results in Table C3 below. The results confirm that my findings hold when I use factor scores from a three-factor solution.

Table C3: Results robust to using factor scores from three-factor solution

	Trust Other Europeans	Favor EU Foreign Policy
	(1)	(2)
Unity (from 3-factor)	−0.073**	−0.080**
	(0.007)	(0.016)
Equality (from 3-factor)	0.226**	0.382**
	(0.018)	(0.039)
National Attachment	0.050**	−0.004
	(0.007)	(0.014)
Eur. Identification	0.055**	0.077**
	(0.010)	(0.020)
Generalized Trust	0.275**	0.058**
	(0.017)	(0.012)
Other EU Visits	0.025	0.045**
	(0.016)	(0.010)
Ideology (right)	0.005	−0.046**
	(0.014)	(0.011)
Male	0.011**	0.059**
	(0.004)	(0.013)
University	0.026**	0.051**
	(0.006)	(0.016)
Age dummies	✓	✓
Country/Wave Fixed Effects	✓	✓
Constant	0.183**	0.331**
	(0.021)	(0.020)
N	29,877	29,919
R^2	0.199	0.141

$^*p < .05; ^{**}p < .01$

Note: OLS coefficients with standard errors clustered by country. The dependent variable and continuous independent variables have been rescaled from 0 to 1. All models incorporate population weights and include country and survey year fixed effects, and include age dummies suppressed for space. Reference categories are France and 65 years and older.

Table C4: Equality associated with more support for a European army

	European Army Only	European & National Armies
Unity	-1.277**	-0.959**
	(0.255)	(0.169)
Equality	3.034**	2.324**
	(0.625)	(0.308)
National Attachment	-1.098**	-0.260*
	(0.091)	(0.113)
Eur. Identification	0.792**	0.597**
	(0.136)	(0.077)
Generalized Trust	0.414**	0.407**
	(0.131)	(0.100)
EU Visits	0.580**	0.297**
	(0.041)	(0.055)
Ideology(right)	-0.759**	-0.176*
	(0.119)	(0.086)
Male	0.501**	0.061
	(0.093)	(0.085)
University	0.393**	0.332**
Age dummies	✓	✓
Country/Wave Fixed Effects	✓	✓
Intercept	-1.170**	-0.690**
	(0.292)	(0.150)
N	27431.000	

$^*p < .05; ^{**}p < .01$

Note: Table displays estimates from a multinomial logistic regression with standard errors clustered by country; coefficients are relative to the baseline choice of having a national army only. Models incorporate population weights and include 16 dummy variables for n-1 countries represented in the data and controls for gender, age, and university education, suppressed for space — France is the reference category.

Table C4 presents results from the multinomial logit model used to produce the predicted probability plots in chapter 5. Like standard logit coefficients, coefficient estimates indicate increases or decreases in the log odds that a participant selects a particular option — European army only or European & national armies — relative to the "national army only" baseline category. The results indicate that increases in unity correlate with decreases in the log odds that

participants prefer a European army alone or in conjunction with a national army, compared to retaining their national army alone. Equality has the opposite effect, increasing the log odds that a participant prefers some form of European army.

C.1.6   Results robust to including the "no army" category

Table C5 presents results from a multinomial logit model regressing the European army selection on the panel of independent variables. Here, I include participants who selected "neither nor" in response to the question asking whether they support a national or European army. My theory does not offer clear predictions about which Europeans ought to prefer having no militaries. But interestingly, the results show that unity-oriented Europeans select "no army" at lower rates that "national army only" — suggesting a status quo orientation toward defense. Equality-oriented Europeans, by contrast, do not seem to distinguish between retaining national armies and having no army, preferring supranational integration to both.

Table C5: Unity associated with less support for no army relative to national army status quo

	European Army Only	European & National Armies	No army
Unity	-1.251**	-0.944**	-1.395**
	(0.248)	(0.169)	(0.156)
Equality	3.001**	2.313**	0.900
	(0.605)	(0.307)	(0.497)
National Attachment	-1.067**	-0.240*	-1.834**
	(0.091)	(0.111)	(0.145)
Eur Identification	0.775**	0.584**	-0.009
	(0.142)	(0.078)	(0.158)
Generalized Trust	0.390**	0.390**	0.606*
	(0.127)	(0.101)	(0.271)
EU Visits	0.573**	0.289**	0.471
	(0.045)	(0.055)	(0.290)
Ideology(right)	-0.742**	-0.164	-2.045**
	(0.119)	(0.088)	(0.261)
Male	0.502**	0.061	0.028
	(0.093)	(0.085)	(0.093)
Age dummies	✓	✓	✓
Country/Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓
Intercept	-1.171**	-0.696**	-0.095
	(0.279)	(0.146)	(0.177)
N	28717		

$^*p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$

Note: Table displays estimates from a multinomial logistic regression with standard errors clustered by country; coefficients are relative to the baseline choice of having a national army only. Models incorporate population weights and include 16 dummy variables for n-1 countries represented in the data and controls for gender, age, and university education, suppressed for space — France is the reference category.

C.1.7 Regression results for favoring economic and social support

Table C6 presents OLS estimates from a model that regresses whether respondents favor providing economic and social support to fellow EU members on unity, equality, and the panel of controls (results depicted in the book's Figure 5.6). The model includes age dummies, country and survey year fixed effects (standard errors clustered by country), and incorporates population weights.

Table C6: Equality increases support for economic and social support

	Provide Economic/Social Support
Unity	−0.102**
	(0.016)
Equality	0.355**
	(0.039)
National Attachment	0.023*
	(0.011)
Eur. Identification	0.064**
	(0.012)
Generalized Trust	0.059**
	(0.012)
Other EU Visits	−0.015**
	(0.006)
Ideology (right)	−0.098**
	(0.021)
Male	0.010
	(0.007)
University	0.015*
	(0.007)
Age dummies	✓
Country/Survey Year Fixed Effects	✓
Constant	0.465**
	(0.028)
N	29,940
R^2	0.148

$^*p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$

Note: Table displays OLS coefficients, with standard errors clustered by country; coefficients are relative to the baseline choice of having a national army only. Models incorporate population weights and include 16 dummy variables for n-1 countries represented in the data and controls for gender, age, and university education, suppressed for space — France is the reference category.

C.2 IntUne Elite Surveys

C.2.1 Cross-national descriptive statistics for elite security cooperation support

The survey gauged elite support for the common foreign and security policy with responses to the following prompt: "Thinking about the European Union over the next ten years or so, can you tell me whether you are in favour or against the following." Respondents indicated support for "A single EU foreign policy toward outside countries" on a scale from "strongly in favour" to "strongly against." Figure C5 displays mean scores, rescaled to range from 0 to 1, and the vertical line depicts the overall sample mean. Elites also responded to the question about support for a European army versus maintaining national armies, or adopting both European and national armies. Figure C6 depicts the distribution of elite responses to this question, by country.

Figure C5: Mean CFSP support by country for European elites

Note: Dots depict mean (with 95% confidence intervals) CFSP support, pooled across the two survey waves. The variable has been rescaled to range from 0 to 1, and higher values indicate greater support. Vertical black line indicates the overall sample mean.

Figure C6: Elite support for a European army by country

Note: Bars depict the percentage of people who support a national army only, a European army only, or both a national and European army, by country, pooled across the 2007 and 2009 survey waves.

C.2.2   Regression results for elite CFSP support

Table C7 displays coefficients from 3 OLS models that regress support for the common foreign and security policy on unity, equality, and a panel of controls for the sample of European elites. Models 1 and 2 correspond to Figure 5.13 in the book. Model 3 excludes ideology and contact with EU institutions to address concerns about potential post-treatment bias. The results again show that including these variables has little effect on the estimates for unity and equality.

Following the mass public analyses, Model 4 includes an interaction between unity and equality to affirm that equality does not constrain unity. I again find evidence that equality and unity exerts significant direct effects on support for the CFSP.

Table C7: Equality increases CFSP support among European elites

			Favor EU Foreign Policy		High ID	Low Id
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Unity	−0.082**	−0.057*	−0.061*	−0.153	−0.054*	−0.101
	(0.028)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.095)	(0.023)	(0.065)
Equality	0.307**	0.274**	0.269**	0.222**	0.236**	0.479**
	(0.049)	(0.042)	(0.039)	(0.076)	(0.044)	(0.070)
EU Contacts		0.003		0.003	0.009**	−0.018
		(0.003)		(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.014)
Political Elite		−0.022**	−0.023*	−0.022**	−0.019*	−0.052
		(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.030)
European Attachment		0.180**	0.181**	0.180**		
		(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)		
National Attachment		−0.112**	−0.114**	−0.112**	−0.047*	−0.231**
		(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.021)	(0.083)
Ideology (right)		−0.054		−0.054	−0.060	−0.028
		(0.038)		(0.038)	(0.036)	(0.076)
Male		0.016	0.009	0.016	0.016	0.011
		(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.027)
Unity x Equality				0.116		
				(0.110)		
Country/Wave Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Constant	0.670**	0.657**	0.648**	0.697**	0.765**	0.833**
	(0.033)	(0.042)	(0.035)	(0.062)	(0.040)	(0.119)
N	3,741	3,532	3,712	3,532	3,056	476
R^2	0.198	0.230	0.225	0.230	0.160	0.393

$^*p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$
Note: Models report OLS coefficients with standard errors clustered by country. The dependent variable and continuous independent variables have been rescaled from 0 to 1. All models include country and survey year fixed effects. France is the reference category.

Models 5 and 6 examine the effects of unity and equality and high and low values on the European attachment scale. These models face two challenges unique to the elite surveys that affect interpretation. First, the elite questionnaire excluded the less potentially content-laden "European identification" question. I instead include a question about European attachment, which may be more susceptible to concerns that respondents summon pre-existing ideas about

content when they report their attachment levels.

Second, European attachment levels among elites were positively skewed — 86.2% of respondents report that they feel "somewhat" or "very" attached to Europe. I estimate the OLS models for subsamples of elites who report that they are "somewhat" or "very" attached to Europe (Model 5), and the 476 respondents who declined to respond or reported that they are "not at all" or "not very" attached (Model 6). The results confirm that European attachment does not supplant content as an important correlate of support for European security cooperation. Unity has a negative effect in both the high and low-attachment elites, though the negative effect is not statistically significant among the 476 elites who report the weakest attachments. Similarly, the relationship between equality and CFSP support remains positive across attachment levels. The larger coefficient on equality in the low-attachment subsample, compared to the high attachment subsample, suggests a counterintuitive weakening of equality's effects among the most committed Europeans. Yet these effect sizes must be considered in light of the dependent variable distribution: The marginal effect of equality in Model 5 spans the distance from the model intercept to maximum support. The results collectively support my core propositions about equality and unity's countervailing associations with common foreign policy support.

C.2.3 Results robust to alternative factor score specifications

Table C8 presents results from two OLS models that regress CFSP support on independent variables derived from two different measurement models that include the cultural traditions item that appeared on the elite survey. The first model uses factor scores for unity and equality estimated from a two-factor solution that includes the cultural traditions item ($TLI = 0.908$, $RMSEA = 0.073 \, [0.064, 0.082]$). Model 2 uses all items but instead retains 3 factors, with the

cultural traditions item loading strongly on one factor, joined by "to be Christian" (which loads weakly on both unity (0.313) and Culture (0.292) in the three-factor solution ($TLI = 0.998$, $RMSEA = 0.01 \, [0, 0.031]$).

The results confirm that my findings and conclusions are largely robust to these alternative measurement strategies, though the coefficient on unity is not statistically significant in model 2. Instead, the cultural traditions factor has a negative association with support for the CFSP ($b = -0.057, p < 0.027$).

Table C8: Elite results robust to alternative factor scores for unity and equality

	CFSP Support	
	(1)	(2)
Unity (2-factor)	−0.067*	
	(0.027)	
Equality (2-factor)	0.268**	
	(0.042)	
Unity (3-factor)		−0.025
		(0.024)
Culture(3-factor)		−0.057*
		(0.027)
Equality (3-factor)		0.323**
		(0.046)
EU Contacts	0.003	0.003
	(0.003)	(0.003)
Political Elite	−0.023**	−0.022*
	(0.009)	(0.009)
European Attachment	0.177**	0.175**
	(0.031)	(0.031)
National Attachment	−0.109**	−0.111**
	(0.040)	(0.038)
Ideology (right)	−0.059	−0.052
	(0.039)	(0.038)
Male	0.015	0.016
	(0.010)	(0.010)
Country/Wave Fixed Effects	✓	✓
Constant	0.676**	0.641**
	(0.042)	(0.044)
N	3,514	3,514
R^2	0.227	0.233

$^*p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$

Note: Models report OLS coefficients with standard errors clustered by country. The dependent variable and continuous independent variables have been rescaled from 0 to 1. All models include country and survey year fixed effects. France is the reference category.

C.3 Eurobarometer 92.3 (2019) Analyses

Table C9 presents estimates from models that regress support for the common foreign and defence policies, respectively, on proxies for equality, unity, no bonds and a panel of control variables using the 2019 Eurobarometer data. Models 1, 2, 4, and 5 present logit coefficients after omitting "don't know" responses; Models 3 and 6 recode "don't know" responses to the scale midpoint. All models incorporate population weights. The results suggest that equality corresponds to greater support for foreign policy cooperation in 2019. Figure 5.15 depicts predicted probabilities estimates generated from models 2 and 5.

Table C9: Equality associated with more support for EU security integration in 2019

	Common Foreign Policy			Common Defense Policy		
	Logit		OLS	Logit		OLS
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Equality (dichotomous)	0.244**	0.167*	0.027**	0.346**	0.281**	0.037**
	(0.065)	(0.070)	(0.006)	(0.072)	(0.079)	(0.006)
Unity (dichotomous)	−0.003	−0.042	−0.005	−0.033	−0.036	−0.007
	(0.070)	(0.077)	(0.007)	(0.077)	(0.085)	(0.006)
No bonds	−0.882**	−0.393**	−0.083**	−0.859**	−0.426**	−0.085**
	(0.089)	(0.109)	(0.011)	(0.092)	(0.109)	(0.010)
Close to Europe		1.689**	0.281**		1.518**	0.220**
		(0.111)	(0.010)		(0.121)	(0.009)
Close to Country		0.155	0.016		0.444**	0.053**
		(0.136)	(0.012)		(0.145)	(0.011)
Ideology (right)		−0.613**	−0.097**		−0.405**	−0.051**
		(0.120)	(0.011)		(0.134)	(0.011)
Male		−0.044	0.001		−0.001	0.003
		(0.057)	(0.005)		(0.062)	(0.005)
Age dummies		✓	✓		✓	✓
Country dummies	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Constant	0.952**	0.422*	0.605**	1.736**	0.892**	0.687**
	(0.085)	(0.165)	(0.015)	(0.102)	(0.192)	(0.013)
N	24,477	21,022	22,891	25,250	21,530	22,891
R^2			0.115			0.098

$^*p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$
Note: Cell entries are logit (Models 1, 2, 4, and 5) or OLS (Models 3 and 6) coefficients, standard errors in parentheses. All models include country fixed effects. France is the reference category.

C.4 Eurobarometer 81.4 (2014) Analyses

Table C10 presents results from 6 OLS models that regress support for facing economic crises together and the EU becoming a federation of states on proxies for equality, unity, no bonds, and a panel of control variables using the 2014 Eurobarometer survey. Panels a and b in Figure 5.17 depict estimates from Models 2 and 5. Models 1, 2, 4, and 5 omit "don't know" responses; Models 3 and 6 recode "don't know" responses to the scale midpoint. Cell entries represent OLS coefficients, and models incorporate survey weights. The results again suggest a positive relationship between equality and support for these alternative forms of intra-European cooperation.

Table C10: Equality associated with support for economic cooperation and EU federation in 2014

	Face Economic Crisis Together			Support EU Federation		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Equality	0.024**	0.018**	0.019**	0.023**	0.013*	0.011*
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)
Unity	−0.008*	−0.010*	−0.011**	0.002	−0.008	−0.004
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)
No Bonds	−0.067**	−0.044**	−0.057**	−0.093**	−0.084**	−0.057**
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.006)
National and European		0.072**	0.080**		0.073**	0.058**
		(0.003)	(0.003)		(0.005)	(0.004)
European and National		0.083**	0.090**		0.117**	0.099**
		(0.007)	(0.007)		(0.009)	(0.008)
European Only		0.116**	0.126**		0.156**	0.136**
		(0.012)	(0.012)		(0.017)	(0.014)
Ideology (right)		−0.023**	−0.018**		0.019	0.011
		(0.007)	(0.007)		(0.010)	(0.008)
Male		0.006	0.007*		0.015**	0.011**
		(0.003)	(0.003)		(0.004)	(0.004)
Age dummies		✓	✓		✓	✓
Country dummies	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Constant	0.839**	0.824**	0.806**	0.560**	0.518**	0.512**
	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.008)
N	26,884	21,729	22,368	21,879	18,331	22,368
R^2	0.053	0.075	0.085	0.110	0.134	0.111

$^*p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$

Note: OLS coefficients, standard errors in parentheses. All models include country fixed effects, and continuous variables are rescaled to range from 0 to 1. France is the reference category.

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